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The Chinese Copyright Dream
Sean A. Pager* & Eric Priest**

Abstract
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision of the “Chinese Dream” has
captured the popular imagination. As a slogan, the Chinese Dream
is intentionally broad. Intended to inspire rather than prescribe, it
captures diverse aspirations including dreams of material prosperity, environmental sustainability, national rejuvenation, and global
leadership. The Dream’s ramifications continue to ricochet through
state policy echelons and lend themselves to competing interpretations. In that spirit, we advance a modest suggestion: that the Chinese Dream should be, at least in part, a dream about copyright law.
A more effective copyright system would bolster China’s creative
industries, generating a diverse supply of high-quality expressive
works whose realization would advance many plausible goals of the
Chinese Dream. Yet, copyright has a more fundamental role to play.
Xi himself has emphasized that “[t]he Chinese dream, after all, is
the dream of the people.” Now that dreaming broadly and boldly is
state policy, China’s people need the space to dream. Copyright
provides a mechanism to harness the collective imagination of
China’s authors and artists. Decentralized investments in diverse,
high-quality media will stimulate the robust popular discourse that

* Professor of Law; Associate Director, Intellectual Property, Information & Communications
Law Program, Michigan State University College of Law.
** Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. Professor Priest is a member of the
U.S.–China IP Cooperation Dialogue organized by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Renmin University.
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China needs to articulate and actualize its Dream. In short, copyright can help China dream its own dream.
Because the Dream metaphor is meant to inspire bold thinking, we
argue that China should be equally bold in reimagining copyright
law for the future. China has shown great capacity to trailblaze in
technological fields such as telecommunications and payment systems, leapfrogging Western legacy systems bogged down by path
dependence and entrenched stakeholders. China should harness its
technological prowess to similarly reinvent copyright in a more efficient, streamlined form. Ultimately, China must devise its own
copyright system that reflects its needs and priorities, but we suggest
a few candidates for such streamlining: simplified substantive
rights; an automated, online registration and licensing platform;
enhanced accessibility measures for small creators; low-cost enforcement mechanisms; and targeted use of competition law. A
state-of-the-art Chinese copyright system reflecting suitably ambitious reforms will pay lasting dividends, not only for China’s creators and content industries, but ultimately for all of China. To succeed, however, China will have to adjust its current top-down
approach to cultural policy and allow greater room for decentralized expression. Creative inspiration—like dreams—emerges
through mysterious processes. China should muster the confidence
to dream boldly in copyright policy and reap the rewards in cultural
vitality.
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I. INTRODUCTION

China’s president Xi Jinping has a dream.1 Upon taking power in 2013,
Xi announced a new slogan to define his era: the “Chinese Dream.”2 Like
Martin Luther King before him, Xi’s dream proclaimed a vision of his country’s destiny. Where King’s rhetoric invoked the American Dream and its
foundational promises of liberty and equality, the “Chinese Dream” was less
clearly tied to articulated policy aims. In the ensuing years, the ramifications
of Xi’s dream have reverberated through China’s communist party policy apparatus as competing factions strive to implement the leader’s vision while
bending it to their particular agendas.3
Xi’s Chinese Dream struck a chord in Chinese society that its stodgier
predecessors, such as Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” and Hu Jintao’s
“Harmonious Society,” never could.4 The Chinese Dream has inspired hit pop
songs, academic conferences, and grammar-school contests.5 While previous
official slogans “focused on internal politics and were problem-oriented mottos,” the Chinese Dream is “future oriented and outward looking in search of
China’s greatness in the world.”6 The new messaging marked a generational
change in leadership and heralded the new-found confidence of a strong China
no longer reticent to reassert its Great Power status.7 In previous Party edicts,
“[n]o ‘dreams’ were alluded to much less officially sanctioned. The Chinese
people were told to work, to study, but never to dream. The Party in essence
served as China’s ‘Tiger Mom.’ But, of course, Chinese did and do dream.
Chinese art, literature, and philosophy throughout history were filled with

1. See Xi Jinping’s Vision: Chasing the Chinese Dream, ECONOMIST (May 4, 2013),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2013/05/04/chasing-the-chinese-dream [hereinafter Chasing the
Chinese Dream] (detailing President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Joseph Kahn, China Makes Commitment to Social Harmony, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/12/world/asia/12china.html (explaining Hu Jintao’s “Harmonious
Society” ideology); Chasing the Chinese Dream, supra note 1. “The adoption of a personal slogan—
one that conveys a sense of beyond-normal wisdom and vision in a short, memorable and perhaps
somewhat opaque phrase—has been a rite of passage for all Chinese leaders.” Chasing the Chinese
Dream, supra note 1. Xi Jinping’s “‘Chinese dream’ slogan is exceptional, though, . . . [t]he dream
seems designed to inspire rather than inform.” Id.
5. See Chasing the Chinese Dream, supra note 1.
6. JING SUN, RED CHAMBER, WORLD DREAM: ACTORS, AUDIENCE, AND AGENDA IN CHINESE
FOREIGN POLICY AND BEYOND 132 (2021).
7. See id. at 132–33.
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dreams.”8 Now, dreaming broadly and boldly is state policy.
At the time of this writing, nearly a decade after Xi first heralded the Chinese Dream, the Dream remains “a key concept” and “abiding goal of the
Communist Party of China to seek national rejuvenation . . . .”9 Moreover,
“Xi Jingping Thought” has been enshrined in China’s constitution, granting
core tenets of the Dream canonical status within the Party.10
But what does the Chinese Dream mean? Is it an individualistic dream—
a vision of a better material life?11 Does it capture a broader aspiration of
personal happiness? 12 Does it gesture toward a greener, more sustainable
pathway to development?13 Or herald a commitment to the rule of law, with
strengthened rights for ordinary citizens?14 Perhaps it is an outward-looking
dream of a peaceful, prosperous rise of China to leadership on the world
stage?15 Or is it, instead, a harder edged dream of military dominance in a

8. Winberg Chai & May-lee Chai, The Meaning of Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream, 20 AM. J.
CHINESE STUD. 95, 96 (2013).
9. Cao Desheng, Xi: Chinese Dream Is the People’s Dream, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 10, 2021),
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202111/10/WS618afb05a310cdd39bc74540.html.
10. Salvatore Babones, The Meaning of Xi Jinping Thought, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 2, 2017).
11. Jiayu Wang, Representing Chinese Nationalism/Patriotism Through President Xi Jinping’s
“Chinese Dream” Discourse, 16 J. LANGUAGE & POL. 830, 833 (2017).
12. See Chai & Chai, supra note 8, at 95–96 (noting that, according to Caixin, “China’s arguably
most respected news magazine,” the Chinese Dream refers to “personal happiness for the Chinese
people: ‘The fulfillment of China’s top national priorities requires a renewed focus on happiness’”).
13. See Thomas L. Friedman, China Needs Its Own Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/opinion/friedman-china-needs-its-own-dream.html. Some observers viewed Xi’s initial “Chinese Dream” speech as, in part, a response to the New York Times
column penned by Thomas Friedman a few months earlier, asking explicitly, “Does Xi have a ‘Chinese
Dream[?],’” and exhorting the Chinese leader to embrace a more sustainable path than the American
Dream of consumerist materialism. Chasing the Chinese Dream, supra note 1 (quoting Friedman,
supra). While Xi’s dream clearly extends well beyond environmental policy, his government has
committed to pursuing greener policies, and Xi himself grabbed international headlines at the United
Nations for setting ambitious goals for China to hit peak emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon
neutrality by 2060. Matt McGrath, Climate Change: China Aims for ‘Carbon Neutrality by 2060,’
BBC (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54256826.
14. See Chasing the Chinese Dream, supra note 1 (noting the inherent contradictions between such
rule-of-law rhetoric and a ruling party that sees itself as above the law).
15. Wang, supra note 11, at 843–44; Cao, supra note 9 (“According to the Chinese president, the
Chinese dream is also a dream about peace, development, cooperation and win-win result. It has
resonated far and wide across countries as the world looks to enduring peace and common prosperity.”). Xi Jinping has emphasized that boosting China’s “soft power” influence globally is “a vital
ingredient of [his] ‘Chinese Dream.’” China Is Spending Billions To Make the World Love It,
ECONOMIST (Mar. 25, 2017), https://www.economist.com/china/2017/03/23/china-is-spending-billions-to-make-the-world-love-it; see Wang, supra note 11, at 844.
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post-American world order?16 Depending on the context, it means any of
these and more; it is intentionally vague and malleable.17 As one expert put
it, “Xi’s Chinese Dream is protean. He associates it with different things at
different times in different places. At its core, though, [it] is a vision of national rejuvenation.”18 However, “[t]he vagueness of the ‘Chinese dream’
slogan . . . provides a space in which the Chinese can think of their own
dreams.” 19 Xi himself has acknowledged that, “[i]n the end, the Chinese
dream is the people’s dream.”20
Dreams are mysterious things.21 Their source and meaning often defy
16. See SUN, supra note 6, at 132 (“One representing voice is that of Liu Mingfu . . . from the
National Defense University. In his book titled The China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era, Colonel Liu proclaims that the time has come for China to
replace America as the world’s top military power.”). Xi himself has spoken of a “strong-army
dream,” while stopping short of explicit challenges to U.S. power. Chasing the Chinese Dream, supra
note 1; see also ORVILLE SCHELL & JOHN DELURY, WEALTH AND POWER: CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 387 (2013) (noting that Xi has stated the Chinese Dream includes
“preserv[ing] the bond between a rich country and a strong military”).
17. See Chasing the Chinese Dream, supra note 1; Benjamin Carlson, The World According to Xi
Jingping, ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/xijinping-china-book-chinese-dream/406387/ (observing that “the Chinese Dream can mean many
things to many people”); Chasing the Chinese Dream—If You Can Define It, NPR (Apr. 29, 2013),
https://www.npr.org/2013/04/29/179838801/chasing-the-chinese-dream-if-you-can-define-it (noting
the pliability of the Chinese Dream concept given the diverse interpretations and understandings of its
meaning and implications).
18. Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Here’s Why Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’ Differs Radically from the
American Dream, TIME (Oct. 19, 2015, 12:10 AM), https://time.com/4077693/chinese-dream-xijinping/.
19. Chasing the Chinese Dream, supra note 1.
20. Id. (quoting Jinping Xi, President of the People’s Republic of China, Keynote Address to the
National People’s Congress (Mar. 14, 2013)).
21. The enigmatic nature of dreams has long played an important role in Chinese literature, culture,
spirituality, and philosophy. See ROY BING CHAN, THE EDGE OF KNOWING: DREAMS, HISTORY, AND
REALISM IN MODERN CHINESE LITERATURE 4 (2017). As Roy Bing Chan observes,
Many are familiar with the passage in the “Inner Chapter” of the Zhuangzi titled
“Discussion on Making All Things Equal” (Qi wu lun) in which the philosopher
muses on whether he dreamed of being a butterfly or is actually a butterfly that
dreamed of Zhuangzi. This parable illustrates the constant flux and instability
of reality. In Buddhism, dream is often used as a metaphor for the illusoriness
of the phenomenal world, thus underscoring the necessity of letting go of one’s
attachments.
Id. Dreams feature centrally in Cao Xueqin’s Qing Dynasty-era novel Hong Lou Meng（红楼梦）,
or The Dream of the Red Chamber, arguably the greatest literary work in Chinese history. CAO
XUEQIN, THE STORY OF THE STONE, ALSO KNOWN AS THE DREAM OF THE RED CHAMBER, VOLUME
I: THE GOLDEN DAYS (David Hawkes trans., 1973) (1791). The novel frequently uses dream imagery
to evoke the Buddhist idea that “the worldling’s ‘reality’ is illusion and that life itself is a dream from
which we shall eventually awake.” Id. at 15 (quoting introduction by translator David Hawkes).
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human understanding. Perhaps instead of speculating on what Xi meant, we
might instead consider what a plausible Chinese Dream should entail. Here,
we are going to venture onto a limb and advance a modest suggestion: We
argue that, whatever else the Chinese Dream may encompass, the Chinese
Dream should be, in part, a dream about copyright law.22
Why copyright law? How does copyright relate to Xi’s goal of national
rejuvenation? The answer admittedly may not be intuitive. Yet, there are
several reasons why copyright law deserves a prominent place in the Chinese
Dream.
First, Chinese copyright law aims to “encourag[e] the creation and dissemination of works which would contribute to the construction of socialist
spiritual and material civilization, and . . . promot[e] the development and
flourishing of socialist culture . . . .”23 As such, it accords well with the forward-looking aspirations of Xi’s Chinese Dream. As China seeks to transition
its economy from manufacturing to higher value productivity centered on the
knowledge economy, copyright industries arguably have a valuable role to
play.24 Second, the intangible content-creating industries that copyright protection sustains accord well with environmentalist versions of the Dream, heralding a greener, more sustainable China ready to move beyond its polluting
industrial past.25 Third, copyright advances other plausible conceptions of the
Chinese Dream—by encouraging investment in creative works that simultaneously entertain and edify, copyright advances consumer welfare, fosters national unity through shared media consumption, and promotes a more informed, sophisticated public. 26 Fourth, modernizing China’s copyright

22. See infra Part II (discussing broadly how copyright law relates to the Chinese Dream).
23. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Nov. 11, 2020, effective June 1, 2021), art. 1, 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L
PEOPLE’S CONG. (China) [hereinafter 2020 Copyright Law]. Promoting progress through innovation
represents a core goal of intellectual property law, one that is instantiated in many aspects of copyright
doctrine, including standards on originality, fair use/fair dealing, and the idea-expression dichotomy.
See generally Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 3, 48–56 (2001).
24. See infra Section II.C.
25. See, e.g., McGrath, supra note 13 (explaining President Xi’s environmental goals for China’s
future).
26. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 349–
54 (1996) (asserting that “creative works have broad political and social implications” and are “powerful vehicles for attitude changes or reinforcement”). It’s no accident that the first modern copyright
act, England’s 1701 Statute of Anne, was titled, an “Act for the Encouragement of Learning.” See id.
at 308 n.102. Copyright’s Enlightenment goals were also prominent considerations among the Framers of the U.S. Constitution in creating the Intellectual Property Clause. See id. at 356–57; Sean M.
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system would accord with Xi’s commitment to strengthening the rule of law
and serve to negate China’s enduring notoriety as an epicenter of global piracy.
To the extent that the Chinese Dream harbors an outward vision of Chinese leadership on the world stage, copyright law has far more to offer than
merely reversing the stain of China’s unsavory pirate past. As we explain
below, vibrant cultural industries hold the key to achieving the global “soft
power” to which Chinese leaders have long aspired. Copyright provides the
engine that could underwrite such cultural vitality and produce attractive cultural exports that burnish China’s cross-border influence.27
The final, and perhaps most fundamental, reason why copyright belongs
at the core of the Chinese Dream focuses inwardly on copyright’s effects on
domestic discourse. Copyright scholar Neil Netanel has described the vital
role that copyright plays in promoting democratic discourse by fostering vibrant content industries that operate largely outside of government control.28
As Netanel notes,
In our age of mass media and electronic communication,
much democratic citizenship consists not in face-to-face dialogue or community organization, but rather in exchanging
ideas about political, social, and cultural issues through television, radio, films, newspapers, books, music, art, and now
multi-media CD-ROMs and the [i]nternet. While such fora
lack the intersubjective intimacy of face-to-face interaction,
they are no less a locus of deliberative discourse. Indeed,
they make up the primary space in our society where public
opinion is forged and social norms are contested and elaborated.29
By incentivizing the creation and dissemination of such expressive media,
copyright promotes democratic discourse and “fortif[ies] our democratic institutions by promoting public education, self-reliant authorship, and robust
O’Connor, The Overlooked French Influence on the Intellectual Property Clause, 82 CHI. L. REV.
733, 737–38 (2015); Birnhack, supra note 23, at 17–22, 38–40. In “promoting the progress and flourishing of socialist culture and sciences,” Chinese copyright law follows in this intellectual tradition,
albeit with a socialist twist. See 2020 Copyright Law, supra note 23.
27. See infra Section II.C.
28. See Netanel, supra note 26, at 352–64.
29. Id. at 349 (citations omitted). “The millions of fixed works of authorship that are regularly
broadcast, distributed, and transmitted every day . . . are the lifeblood of civic association.” Id. at 348.
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debate.”30 Moreover, by operating in a decentralized manner through market
mechanisms relatively insulated from state control, copyright supports an independent expressive sector that upholds the democratic character of public
discourse.31
On its face, Netanel’s account of copyright’s democratic function may
seem poorly suited to the Chinese context, given China’s unapologetically authoritarian government and its widespread censorship and media controls.32
Yet, the absence of democracy in China does not negate the value of the democratic discourse that Netanel describes. Indeed, the lack of meaningful opportunities for the public to assert its preferences through elections arguably
underscores the importance of alternative mechanisms for expressions of the
popular will.33 By fostering such public discourse, copyright’s democratic
function can thus arguably play a valuable, socially stabilizing role even in
the absence of democracy.34
Furthermore, promoting and attending to such democratic expression affords China’s government a much-needed source of legitimacy. Having
largely jettisoned its revolutionary commitment to Communist ideology—in
practical policy terms, albeit not rhetorically—China’s Communist Party has
long retained its mantle of legitimacy by delivering material prosperity

30. Id. at 291. Skeptics might question whether copyright incentives are needed in the digital age
where social media platforms facilitate non-commercial exchanges between ordinary citizens. See,
e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 1–3, 99–106 (2006). A full response to such skeptics requires an extended
answer beyond the present scope. Suffice to say, however, that the level of civil discourse prevalent
on social media falls far short of democratic ideals. See, e.g., Jay David Bolter, Social Media Are
Ruining Political Discourse, ATLANTIC (May 19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/05/why-socialmedia-ruining-political-discourse/589108/. Exchanges on such online platforms are typically superficial, poorly reasoned, factually suspect, and prone to manipulation, sensationalism, and ad hominem attacks; moreover, participants too often remain siloed within narrow echo
chambers that fail to challenge their preconceived positions and biases. While commercially produced
media have their own flaws, the more fully developed and professionally vetted forms of authorial
expression represented there arguably play a vital role in compensating for the former shortcomings
by presenting more nuanced positions and exploring alternative perspectives. Commercial media, of
course, do respond to copyright incentives.
31. See Netanel, supra note 26, at 291.
32. See Beina Xu & Eleanor Albert, Media Censorship in China, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.
(Feb. 17, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china (noting the intense censorship exerted by the Chinese government).
33. See Netanel, supra note 26, at 347; Eric Priest, Copyright and Free Expression in China’s Film
Industry, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 60–68 (2015) [hereinafter Priest, Copyright and Free Expression].
34. See id. at 352–64 (noting copyright law’s potential to impact democracy positively).
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through rapid economic growth.35 Yet, China’s growth trajectory has become
unsustainable, and the full impact—human, environmental, spiritual—of pursuing economic growth at all costs is increasingly apparent.36 Rising inequality, pollution, and corruption have all contributed to growing currents of popular discontent.37 Repression and censorship can only do so much to keep the
lid on social unrest.38 The Party leaders desperately need an alternative means
of legitimation.
Cultural industries provide an ideal solution. Marxist theorists have long
recognized popular culture’s role as an opiate for the masses. Chinese state
media are as adept at deploying bread and circuses as any Roman emperor.39
China’s rulers also value the morally uplifting potential of culture to instill
good values, promote a harmonious society, and foster positive national sentiment through stirring narratives of Chinese heroism and virtue.
But popular culture’s potential goes beyond its use as a vehicle for partyapproved messaging. Propaganda can only go so far in shaping public preferences and warding off criticism.40 Moreover, excessive appeals to nationalist pride risks stoking a rabid patriotism that provokes unintended foreign
policy complications.41 To maintain legitimacy and head off challenges to
Communist Party hegemony, China’s leaders must instead proactively attend
to the public’s needs and aspirations. Xi was correct: in the end, the Chinese
Dream must be a dream of the Chinese people. 42 In the absence of a
35. See ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY 18 (2006).
36. See David Dollar et al., Preface, in CHINA 2049: ECONOMIC CHALLENGES OF A RISING
GLOBAL POWER iv–xxi (David Dollar et al. eds., 2020); EVAN OSNOS, AGE OF AMBITION: CHASING
FORTUNE, TRUTH, AND FAITH IN THE NEW CHINA 130, 151, 311–16 (2014).
37. See Chun Han Wong, Chinese Begin To Vent Discontent with President Xi and His Policies,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2018, 12:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-begin-tovent-discontent-with-president-xi-and-his-policies-1534350856. Having dodged the “color revolutions” that toppled post-communist regimes in many of its neighbors and haunted by the ghosts of Tiananmen square,
China’s leaders have an almost neuralgic fear of civil unrest. See SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE
SUPERPOWER 53 (2008). China has mobilized an army of censors to squash dissenting voices and
keeps a close watch on social gatherings. See REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED:
THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 34–40 (2012). Even so, undercurrents of discontent continue to bubble up as China’s rising middle class, a highly educated, digitally savvy cohort,
confront the enduring imperfections of the system and aspire for more. See infra notes 185–87 and
accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Wong, supra note 37.
39. See Eyck Freymann, Maria Repnikova on How China Tells Its Story, THE WIRE CHINA (Apr.
4, 2021), https://www.thewirechina.com/2021/04/04/maria-repnikova-on-how-china-tells-its-story/.
40. See SHIRK, supra note 37, at 97–104.
41. See id. at 64, 98.
42. See Chasing the Chinese Dream, supra note 1 (citing President Xi’s statement that “the
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democratic franchise, the Party needs an alternative mechanism to discover
the people’s will, respond to their grievances, and reorient policies around
public values and priorities.43
China’s government has shown itself surprisingly willing to respond to
public opinion and adjust course accordingly.44 At the same time, the Chinese
state retains a neuralgic fear of public expression and civil society organizations that could threaten its hegemonic authority.45 By stifling public demonstrations, online petitions, or other forms of democratic mobilization, China
has left a gap between its rulers’ claimed mandate to exercise the people’s will
and their ability to accurately determine and respond to popular sentiment.
Mass media consumption and the shared popular expression it promotes
provide a safe space for democratic discourse to function within the limits of
state censorship. Such public discourse, albeit constrained, operates as a prepolitical process that encourages the Chinese public to debate issues, distill
priorities, clarify values, and forge consensus.46 Allowing such bottom-up expression provides a safety valve for the Chinese public to vent their frustrations.47 It also allows China’s rulers to take measure of public sentiment and
reorient policies to respond to the public will.48
Chinese Dream is the people’s dream”).
43. See DANIELA STOCKMANN, MEDIA COMMERCIALIZATION AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN
CHINA 14–15 (2013) (“Over time, the dynamics of responsive authoritarianism in Chinese newspapers
appear to have led to cautious adjustments of the CCP’s political positions as disseminated by newspapers. . . . Market-based media may increase the responsiveness of authoritarian rulers while also
preventing pluralism and disintegration.”).
44. See id.; see also MARIA REPNIKOVA, MEDIA POLITICS IN CHINA: IMPROVISING POWER UNDER
AUTHORITARIANISM 111–41 (2017); SHIRK, supra note 37, at 103–04; CHRISTOPHER HEURLIN,
RESPONSIVE AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA: LAND, PROTESTS, AND POLICY MAKING (2016).
45. See Xu & Albert, supra note 32.
46. See Binchun Meng, From Steamed Bun to Grass Mud Horse: E Gao as Alternative Political
Discourse on the Chinese Internet, 7 GLOB. MEDIA & COMMC’N 33, 39 (2011) (“The control over
political discussion and the difficulty of articulating a counter-hegemonic agenda in the Chinese context have only made it more important to explore political discourses in non-conventional formats.”).
47. See id. at 44 (“[T]he dirty pun of Grass Mud Horse,” which “has become a euphemism often
used by netizens to refer to the act of censorship, . . . represents the average internet users’ anger and
frustration at censorship, and with the help of digital technology this unique form of expression is
evolving into a collective attempt at resistance.”).
48. See Freymann, supra note 39; see also SHIRK, supra note 37, at 103–04; Angela Hsu et al.,
Why Has This Environmental Documentary Gone Viral on China’s Internet?, CHINAFILE (Mar. 3,
2015), https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/why-has-environmental-documentary-gone-viral-chinas-internet (discussing the Chinese independent documentary “Under the Dome,” which investigated
China’s chronic air pollution problem, was viewed hundreds of millions of times, and led to official
recognition of pollution problems); Priest, Copyright and Free Expression, supra note 33, at 60–68
(discussing how Chinese filmmakers push censorship boundaries, sometimes resulting in formal
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However, to make this work requires decentralized cultural processes that
bubble upward organically rather than emanating through top-down decrees.49
As Netanel explains, copyright provides the ideal tool to nurture such decentralized expression. 50 China is a country beset by internal contradictions,
struggling to reconcile its communist ideology with its capitalist reality and
to balance the embrace of modernity with enduring respect for its ancient traditions and heritage.51 Globally, China is still feeling its way as a resurgent
Great Power, aspiring to global leadership, yet distrusted by many of its neighbors.52 Finding the right path forward to negotiate these contradictions will
require harnessing the collective imagination of China’s people.53 In short,
China needs the space to dream.
Copyright, and the creative content it underwrites, can facilitate this process.54 Tellingly, Hollywood and other popular-content industries are often
referred to as “dream factories.”55 On one level, the phrase evokes celluloid
fantasies that shimmer evanescently on the silver screen, cloaked in Tinseltown’s glamor.56 But at a deeper level, “dream factory” captures well the role
that popular media play in fostering public discourse and shaping visions of

changes to censorship rules over time).
49. See Netanel, supra note 26, at 347–63.
50. See id. at 288 (“Copyright provides an incentive for creative expression on a wide array of
political, social, and aesthetic issues, thus bolstering the discursive foundations for democratic culture
and civic association.”).
51. See Wasserstrom, supra note 18 (“Xi makes no secret of wanting to see China assume a position of international centrality, as well as to see it modernize while revering its classical traditions.”).
52. China claims to champion the developing world against Western domination. See RUSH DOSHI,
THE LONG GAME: CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY TO DISPLACE AMERICAN ORDER 239–40 (2021). Yet,
it is increasingly willing to act unilaterally to reassert its own historic role as a global hegemon. Id. at
277–96.
53. See Robert Lawrence Kuhn, Understanding the Chinese Dream, CHINA DAILY USA (July 19,
2013), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-07/19/content_16814756.htm (“The Chinese dream
is both collective and individual.”); Wasserstrom, supra note 18 (“The Chinese state today is robust,
yet the country’s leaders won’t let fears of its being precariously weak die a natural death. If only they
would. Then there would be space not just for their dreams but the often different ones of many
individual Chinese.”).
54. See Netanel, supra note 26, at 288 (explaining copyright’s function in a democratic society).
55. See Robert Sklar, Hollywood’s Dream Factory: Luring Moviegoers Out of Their Own Lives,
Into Distant and Exotic Worlds, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1978/02/23/hollywoods-dream-factory-luring-moviegoers-out-of-their-own-lives-intodistant-and-exotic-worlds/92ac96dc-5758-4a53-a385-78e6eeb4b8ff/ (observing that, “in its heyday,”
Hollywood was often referred to as “The Dream Factory”).
56. See id. (discussing “Hollywood’s glamorous attraction” and asserting that movies “fulfill a
unique role as purveyors of dreams to a popular audience”).
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the future.57
By harnessing the creative visions of China’s artists and stimulating popular debates over conflicting imperatives, copyright thus has a vital role to
play: it can help China dream its own dream. In the end, copyright is thus
about how to dream as much as it is what the Chinese Dream should be. However, China’s copyright system could itself benefit from bolder imagination.
In the pages that follow, we offer some tentative suggestions as to how to
pursue the Chinese copyright dream.
II. WHY IS COPYRIGHT AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE CHINESE DREAM?
A. A Development Policy Focused on China’s Culture Industries May at
First Blush Appear Unsuitable
1. Chinese Development Policy Has Focused on Industrial and
Technological Development
Focusing on copyright and cultural policy as a development strategy
might seem counterintuitive in light of China’s recent development history.58
China’s development success is usually measured in terms of economic
growth, industrial capacity, and infrastructure development.59 The industrial
sector has driven China’s stunning economic growth since the beginning of
the post-Cultural Revolution economic reforms.60 As a result of government
policies prioritizing growth through exports and investment in industry, 61
China is best known as “the world’s factory, churning out massive quantities
of laboriously produced goods,” not as a producer of modern culture or intangibles.62 To the extent that innovation has been perceived and articulated as
part of China’s development strategy, the focus has been on innovation in
57. See Netanel, supra note 26, at 349 (discussing popular media’s ability to “make up the primary
space in our society where public opinion is forged and social norms are contested and elaborated”).
58. See, e.g., BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH 329–33
(2007) (outlining China’s post-reform economic development).
59. See id. at 329; Yao Yang, China’s Economic Growth in Retrospect, in CHINA 2049: ECONOMIC
CHALLENGES OF A RISING GLOBAL POWER, supra note 36, at 7–9.
60. See NAUGHTON, supra note 58, at 329.
61. C. FRED BERGSTEN, CHARLES FREEMAN, NICHOLAS R. LARDY & DEREK J. MITCHELL,
CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 105–10 (2009) (stating that China’s “net exports of
goods and services” and “[e]xpanding investment ha[ve] been a major and increasingly important
driver of China’s growth”).
62. NAUGHTON, supra note 58, at 349.
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science, technology, and manufacturing, not cultural creativity.63
Emphasizing development through technological innovation is not an approach unique to China, of course.64 Academics and policymakers typically
focus on technological capacity and know-how because “development is generally viewed as a function of productivity growth, further industrialization,
and greater technological acumen.” 65 A development strategy focused on
technology and industry seems especially compelling in China’s case, however, because China is perceived as having a high capacity for technological
competence.66
2. Modern China Is Perceived as a Cultural Minnow
Moreover, unlike its Asian neighbors—India, Korea, and Japan—modern
China is not known for its cultural innovation.67 Although China boasts one
of the richest and most influential cultural traditions in history, its modern
cultural works have failed to rouse overseas and domestic audiences alike.
For example, although China produces more television shows than any other
country, it imports far more television content than it exports because the
overseas audience for its shows is small.68 Even contemporary Chinese works
that receive attention overseas have been blasted, often by Chinese artists

63. See, e.g., DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN: GOVERNMENT,
INNOVATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA 10–20 (2011). See generally
STEVEN W. POPPER ET AL., CHINA’S PROPENSITY FOR INNOVATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2020).
64. See James Broughel & Adam Thierer, Technological Innovation and Economic Growth, GEO.
MASON UNIV.: MERCATUS CTR. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/entrepreneurship/technological-innovation-and-economic-growth (“Most economists agree that technological innovation is a key driver of economic growth and human well-being.”).
65. Mark Schultz & Alec van Gelder, Creative Development: Helping Poor Countries by Building
Creative Industries, 97 KY. L.J. 79, 84–85 (2008).
66. See WORLD BANK, CHINA 2030: BUILDING A MODERN, HARMONIOUS, AND CREATIVE HIGHINCOME SOCIETY 163–68 (2012), https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/China-2030-complete.pdf.
67. See Peter Neville-Hadley, How China Shoots Itself in the Foot in Soft Power Game and Why
Its Films and TV Dramas Are Unlikely To Be a Match for South Korea’s—Think Parasite and Squid
Game, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 11, 2022), https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/books/article/3166505/how-china-shoots-itself-foot-soft-power-game-and-why; George Gao,
Why Is China So . . . Uncool?, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 8, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/08/why-is-china-so-uncool-soft-power-beijing-censorship-generation-gap/;
Michael Keane, Keeping Up with the Neighbors: China’s Soft Power Ambitions, 3 CINEMA J. 130 (2010)
(outlining China’s desire to keep up with the cultural progress of its neighboring countries and highlighting the cultural accomplishments of Korea and Japan).
68. OSNOS, supra note 36, at 320.
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themselves, for lacking substance or authenticity. Famous Chinese director
Zhang Yimou, for example, has been accused of making films that pander to
Western tastes in order to attract the validation and money brought by foreign
audiences and investors.69 Renowned Chinese artist and dissident Ai Weiwei,
commenting on an exhibit of contemporary Chinese art in London, likened
modern Chinese art to sweet and sour pork and other Westernized “Chinese”
dishes: “People will eat it and say it is Chinese, but it is simply a consumerist
offering, providing little in the way of a genuine experience of life in China
today.”70 Because Chinese artists lack freedom to criticize the government
and openly reflect many pressing social concerns, Ai contends, works of contemporary Chinese art are little better than traveling acrobatic shows and other
“vehicles of propaganda that showcase skills with no substance, and crafts
with no meaning.”71
3. Chinese Culture Industries Are Encumbered by Operating in a Highly
Sensitive and Regulated Sector
Many Chinese artists share Ai’s view that rigid state cultural policies and
oppressive censorship inhibit China from being a modern cultural power.72
Director Feng Xiaogang—sometimes called “China’s Spielberg”—famously
used a nationally televised award acceptance speech to openly blast state censorship practices that “torment” Chinese directors and weaken Chinese cinema, asking: “Are Hollywood directors tormented the same way?”73 Some
Chinese artists even give a name to the creative hamstringing wrought by state
interference in the creative process: the “Kung Fu Panda problem.”74 The
“problem” refers to the fact that “the most successful film ever made about
two of China’s national symbols, kung fu and pandas, had to be made by a

69. See Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, National Cinema, Cultural Critique, Transnational Capital: The
Films of Zhang Yimou, in TRANSNATIONAL CHINESE CINEMAS: IDENTITY, NATIONHOOD, GENDER
105–07 (Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu ed., 1997).
70. Ai Weiwei, Ai Weiwei: ‘China’s Art World Does Not Exist,’ GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2012, 2:00
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2012/sep/10/ai-weiwei-china-art-world.
71. Id.
72. See id.; see also OSNOS, supra note 36, at 320–21.
73. Rachel Lu, Chinese Film Director: ‘Censorship is Torment,’ ATLANTIC (Apr. 18, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/chinese-film-director-censorship-is-torment/275114/ (quoting director Feng Xiaogang).
74. OSNOS, supra note 36, at 320 (“[F]ilm director Lu Chan once agreed to produce a short film
for the Beijing Olympics, but . . . was inundated with so many official ‘directions and orders’ that he
simply abandoned the project and coined a new term: the Kung Fu Panda problem.”).
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foreign studio (DreamWorks), because no Chinese filmmaker would ever
have been allowed to have fun with such solemn subjects.”75
Censors have interfered in cultural production since at least the Tang dynasty (618–907 A.D.), when printing was invented.76 In the Communist Party
era, mass culture has been especially scrutinized.77 Marxism regards bourgeois co-optation of culture as a persistent and profound threat to the proletarian revolution.78 To Mao, therefore, Party control of mass culture was a
political imperative.79 Indeed, friction between Mao and other officials over
the extent of the Party’s cultural influence helped ignite the Cultural Revolution, which shook Chinese society to its core in the 1960s and ’70s.80 Decades
later, strict control over cultural production, importation, and dissemination
persists even in the face of evolving Party objectives and values.81 Pervasive,
broad censorship policies profoundly affect creative production in China.82
China’s internet censorship apparatus pressures creators and platforms to selfcensor83 and clouds all manner of creative expression with uncertainty and
risk.84

75. Id.
76. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 13 (1995).
77. See Junhao Hong, Mao Zedong’s Cultural Theory and China’s Three Mass-Culture Debates:
A Tentative Study of Culture, Society, and Politics, 4 INTERCULTURAL COMMC’N STUDS. 87, 88
(1994).
78. Id. at 95–96.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 97. Decades later, such tensions still reverberate, as was demonstrated in 2011 when a
statue of Confucius was unveiled in Tiananmen square to great fanfare and with state sanction, only
to be removed months later in the middle of the night without warning or explanation. See Andrew
Jacobs, Confucian Statue Vanishes Near Tiananmen Square, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/world/asia/23confucius.html?_r=0.
81. See, e.g., Oliver Holmes, No Cults, No Politics, No Ghouls: How China Censors the Video
Game World, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/jul/15/chinavideo-game-censorship-tencent-netease-blizzard?mc_cid=efb1e46707&mc_eid=9947ff9602.
82. See, e.g., id. (showing how Chinese censorship affects the videogame industry); Sara Fischer
& Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, China Builds Its Own Movie Empire, AXIOS (Jan. 22, 2022),
https://www.axios.com/china-builds-its-own-movie-empire-f22b9298-b592-405e-a83cc2ee99878abf.html?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axioschina&stream=china (“The Chinese Communist Party is using domestic films as a key conduit for
mass messaging aimed at achieving political goals, leaving little room for foreign views.”).
83. See MACKINNON, supra note 37, at 31–50; RONALD DEIBERT ET AL., ACCESS CONTROLLED:
THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE 449–73 (2010); Holmes, supra note 81.
84. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 37, at 36 (stating that “[m]any thousands of Chinese websites and dozens of companies have been shuttered because they failed to control their content adequately”).
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4. Piracy Has Long Plagued Creators in China and Inhibited Investment
in Domestic Cultural Production
China has long been perceived as a pirate outlaw that copies other countries’ cultural expression rather than producing its own.85 Piracy used to be
pervasive throughout China.86 Indeed, Western producers complained that
Chinese factories export pirated content to the entire world.87
Endemic piracy in China has exerted a significant drag on domestic cultural production.88 Domestic creators have long complained that their works
get ripped off without remedy.89 For example, in 2012, piracy was so debilitating to the music industry that China’s most prominent music executive,
Song Ke, abruptly quit his job as CEO of the Mainland’s most successful record company to launch a Peking duck restaurant.90 “When I make good roast
duck,” Song lamented, “people pay and thank me. When I make good music,
nobody pays me and some even ridicule me.”91 Piracy was such a serious
problem in China that, in 2012, China’s entire market for legitimate music
CDs was a mere $17 million—accounting for only 0.002% of the global music
industry’s physical-format sales.92 In the film industry, the inability to stem
offline and online piracy to a point that would permit development of a viable
market for physical media, or legitimate online movie distribution (until a few
years ago), left copyright owners of audiovisual works with virtually no

85. See Oliver Ting, Pirates of the Orient: China, Film Piracy, and Hollywood, 14 VILL. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 399, 401 (2007) (citations omitted) (“The current state of Chinese piracy presents a fairly
bleak picture for Hollywood. Despite China’s WTO membership, its updated copyright laws, and its
general assurances of combating piracy . . . [piracy] is still rampant in the country.”).
86. See Eric Priest, The Future of Music and Film Piracy in China, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 795,
795–800 (2006) [hereinafter Priest, The Future of Music and Film Piracy in China].
87. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 19 (2010)
(noting that “optical discs [manufactured in China] are exported to markets across the region, impacting legitimate sales outside of China as well”).
88. See Eric Priest, Copyright Extremophiles: Do Creative Industries Thrive or Just Survive in
China’s High Piracy Environment?, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 467, 511–34 (2014) (detailing how piracy
in China harms domestic content industries) [hereinafter Priest, Copyright Extremophiles].
89. See Priest, The Future of Music and Film Piracy in China, supra note 86, at 798–99; Dan Levin
& John Horn, DVD Pirates Running Rampant in China, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2011, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/la-et-china-piracy-20110322-story.html (“Zhang Yimou, who directed
‘Raise the Red Lantern,’ . . . has called film theft ‘rampant’ and said that ‘boosting copyright protection
is key to the healthy development of [the] film industry.’”).
90. See Mu Qian, Music Isn’t a Dead Duck, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 24, 2012, 7:48 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2012-02/24/content_14687081.htm.
91. Id.
92. Priest, Copyright Extremophiles, supra note 88, at 496.
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aftermarket revenue from physical media such as DVD or Blu-ray.93 This
represented a significant loss, since in the United States at the time, aftermarket revenue from DVD sales and television distribution rights exceeded one
hundred million dollars for a single major film.94 For countless years in a row,
China has appeared on the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301
Report “priority watch list,” a list of a handful of countries that the USTR
believes are the worst intellectual property offenders in the world.95
Piracy remains a significant challenge in China.96 As discussed below,
however, piracy is considerably less problematic today than it was a decade
ago.
B. Views that China’s Copyright Industries Are Poorly Suited for China’s
Development Strategy Are Outdated
While the above account of China’s development policy and its social,
political, and cultural trajectory has some force, it is incomplete and outmoded. Cultural production is increasingly important to China’s economy
and society.97 Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government has identified
the cultural industries as “pillar industries” of the Chinese economy.98 For
some time China’s copyright industries have been positive contributors to the
nation’s economic development.99 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) estimates that as early as 2004 the added value of all the

93. Id. at 485.
94. Id. at 485–86.
95. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2021 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 40–49 (2021),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021%20Special%20301%20Report%20(final).pdf.
96. See id. at 45.
97. See Gan Li & Weiqing Song, Cultural Production in Contemporary China: The Struggle Between Political Dogmatism and Economic Pragmatism, 19 TRAMES 355, 356 (2015),
https://kirj.ee/public/trames_pdf/2015/issue_4/Trames-2015-4-355-366.pdf (citations omitted) (“Similar to previous economic reforms in other sectors, the CCP set a number of objectives for the cultural
sector, including ‘to become a pillar sector of the national economy, with overall strength and enhanced international competitiveness’ . . . and ‘to render the cultural sector into an economic engine,
contributing to the overall economic structural readjustment and more sustainable development.’ Notably, the CCP also officially adopted the strategy of ‘national revitalisation through culture’ (wenhua
xingguo). This strategy is seen as a further step in the revitalisation of China, as it provides an important link between the economic reforms and China’s opening up policy.”).
98. See Xiaoming Zhang, The Cultural Industries in China: A Historical Overview, in HANDBOOK
OF CULTURAL AND CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IN CHINA 107–08 (Michael Keane ed., 2016).
99. WORLD INT’L COPYRIGHT ASS’N, THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF COPYRIGHT-BASED
INDUSTRIES IN CHINA 13 (2009) [hereinafter WIPO ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF COPYRIGHT].
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copyright-based industries in China combined accounted for nearly 5% of national GDP.100 China’s core copyright industries—including literary publishing, film, television, entertainment software, and music—amounted to far less
than that, however, leaving substantial room for growth.101 Indeed, China has
witnessed a boom in several of its culture industries over the past decade.102
Film is the most vivid example. 103 Chinese box office receipts have
soared steadily in recent years from $248 million in 2005104 to $9.2 billion in
2019.105 China is now the world’s largest box office,106 and domestic films
account for nearly 85% of China’s box office revenues.107
Other cultural industries are also impressive economic contributors.
China is the largest video game market in the world, topping $44 billion in
2020.108 China’s animation industry, once moribund, generated $26 billion in
2018 and appears set to be “a creative and economic force” rivaling animation
industries in Japan and the United States.109 Internet giant Tencent, which
dominates China’s streaming-music market, earned revenues of $4.5 billion
in 2020,110 and China’s recorded-music market is now the seventh largest in

100. Id. According to WIPO, “core copyright industries are industries that are wholly engaged in
creation, production and manufacturing, performance, broadcast, communication and exhibition, or
distribution and sales of works and other protected subject matter.” WORLD INT’L COPYRIGHT ASS’N,
GUIDE ON SURVEYING THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE COPYRIGHT-BASED INDUSTRIES 29
(2003).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Priest, Copyright Extremophiles, supra note 88, at 484–86, 495–502 (discussing the
substantial economic growth of China’s music and film industries in recent years).
103. See Priest, Copyright Extremophiles, supra note 88, at 484.
104. See id.
105. Jon Jackson, What China’s Rise to Global Box Office Champs Means for Hollywood’s Future,
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 29, 2021, 11:30 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/china-box-office-hollywoodworried-1580572.
106. Id.
107. See Rebecca Davis, Foreign Films Account for Just 16% of Total China Box Office, Worth $3
Billion in 2020, VARIETY (Jan. 4, 2021, 7:21 PM), https://variety.com/2021/film/news/china-box-office-2020-annual-total-maoyan-1234878626/#!.
108. Top 10 Countries/Markets by Game Revenues, NEWZOO, https://newzoo.com/insights/rankings/top-10-countries-by-game-revenues/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2021).
109. Charley Lanyon & Elaine Yau, Will a Chinese Disney or Studio Ghibli Emerge? As Appetite
for Animation in China Grows, Quality of Domestic Production Improves, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(Jan. 24, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/entertainment/article/3047179/will-chinese-disney-or-studio-ghibli-emerge-appetite (citing RSCH. IN CHINA, GLOBAL AND CHINA
ANIMATION INDUSTRY REPORT, 2019–2025 (2019)).
110. Glenn Peoples, Tencent Music Improves Revenues 15% in 2020, Equals Spotify’s Market Cap,
BILLBOARD (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/9544650/tencent-music-improves-revenues-2020.
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the world.111
China has also emerged as a formidable book-publishing market.112 By
2012, it was already the world’s largest book-publishing industry by volume. 113 In 2020, book publishing generated an estimated $10 billion. 114
Nearly ten million Chinese authors now upload their books for online distribution, hoping for a piece of China’s $5 billion digital-reading market.115 The
wealth and discretionary income of Chinese consumers have risen steadily.116
Chinese consumers have more money to spend on movies, books, music, art,
software, and video games than ever before, and are willing to spend it.117
State censorship in China remains a significant obstacle to China’s cultural industry development.118 Nevertheless, Chinese censorship is not absolute.119 Rather, it is a “three-way dialogue” between the audience, creators,
and the state.120 “Censors wield great power over [creators] but relatively little direct power over the audience, which has the option of simply avoiding”
content it dislikes.121 Creators are incentivized to push the envelope—within
limits—to appeal to audiences, and censors must show some flexibility in order to avoid stifling the creative industries.122 Thus, while censorship is a drag
on China’s cultural industry development, it is not an insurmountable

111. INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT 2021 11 (2021).
112. See generally PWC, BOOK PUBLISHING: KEY INSIGHTS AT A GLANCE 1 (2014),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/global-entertainment-media-outlook/segment-insights/assets/PDF/bookpublishing-key-insights-at-a-glance.pdf.
113. Helen Gao, Why Aren’t Chinese People Reading Books Anymore?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 15, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/08/why-arent-chinese-people-reading-books-anymore/278729/.
114. See OPENBOOK, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT OF CHINA’S BOOK MARKET: ANNUAL BESTSELLERS
AND MARKET TRENDS 4–6 (2020), http://boyanllc.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/2019-ChinaBook-Market.pdf. We derived this estimate (70 billion RMB) from reported annual sales figures based
on list price less reported average discounts by brick-and-mortar and online book retailers. Id.
115. Lai Lin Thomala, Digital Publishing Industry in China—Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Oct.
19, 2021), https://www.statista.com/topics/4603/digital-publishing-industry/ (estimating the value as
35 billion RMB).
116. JONNY HO ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., CHINA CONSUMER REPORT 2020: THE MANY FACES OF
THE CHINESE CONSUMER 3–4 (2020).
117. Id. (noting that “well to-do households” in particular have disposable income that allows them
to spend more money on these types of discretionary purchases).
118. See, e.g., Priest, Copyright and Free Expression, supra note 33, at 41–43.
119. See id. at 58.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 58–60.
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obstacle.123
Piracy is ebbing. It remains a threat to creative industries in China, but
far less so today than in previous decades. Online copyright enforcement in
China, particularly regarding music and audiovisual works, has been quite effective in recent years as major Chinese internet companies have purchased
exclusive content and used their political clout and war chests to root out much
smaller, infringing competitors.124 Skyrocketing licensure rates have spurred
an explosion of creativity, with unprecedented investment pouring into domestic production of music, serials, and films.125
Any lingering perception of China as a one-dimensional, low-innovation
manufacturing economy is likewise tremendously outdated. China’s leaders
have realized for some time that a development strategy myopically focused
on industrial development is economically and environmentally unsustainable.126 In 2007, then-Premier Wen Jiabao admitted that “China’s economic
growth is unsteady, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.” 127
China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan explicitly acknowledged the dangers of a
one-dimensional growth model.128 It called for a shift from development reliant on labor cost advantages and export-oriented, environmentally taxing industrial production to innovation-based development that yields higher margins, domestic intellectual property, and lower energy consumption and
emissions.129 An emphasis on cultural production dovetails with these objectives.130 Cultural production is comparatively “green,” especially in the digital age of decreasing reliance on physical media and its accompanying waste.
It also results in domestically owned and controlled information-based properties. The government has expressly identified “cultural innovation” as an
area for strategic growth and has called for accelerated development of

123. See, e.g., id. at 62–64.
124. Lucy Montgomery & Eric Priest, Copyright in China’s Digital Cultural Industries, in
HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL AND CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IN CHINA, supra note 98, at 339–56.
125. See id. at 345–56; Eric Priest, Meet the New Media, Same as the Old Media: Real Lessons from
China’s Digital Copyright Industries, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1079, 1083–89 (2016) [hereinafter
Priest, Meet the New Media].
126. See Henry S. Rowen, Introduction, in GREATER CHINA’S QUEST FOR INNOVATION 29–30
(Rowen et al. eds., 2008).
127. BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 105.
128. See JOSEPH CASEY & KATHERINE KOLESKI, U.S.–CHINA ECON. & SECURITY REV.
COMMISSION, BACKGROUNDER: CHINA’S 12TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN 8 (2011).
129. See id.
130. See Li & Song, supra note 97, at 356.
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China’s culture industries.131 The rise of China’s animation industry is cited
as a successful example of aggressive government policy support.132
China always seeks to exercise global influence and leadership, but officials recognize that economic and military might alone are insufficient.133 Indeed, China’s aggressive military posturing has alarmed and alienated its
neighbors in recent years, reviving defensive alliances with the United States,
and thereby exacerbating longstanding fears that the country remains exposed
and vulnerable to encirclement.134 Recent diplomatic imbroglios, including
China’s defensiveness regarding origins of the Covid-19 pandemic and provocations incited by its “wolf warrior” diplomats, have further contributed to a
negative global image of the country.135 China’s human rights abuses of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and its crackdowns on pro-democracy demonstrators in Hong Kong have led to widespread condemnation, including a diplomatic boycott by the United States and others of the 2022 Winter Olympics in

131. See Guojia “Shi Er Wu” Shiqi Wenhua Gaige Fazhan Guihua Gangyao (国家“十二五”时期
文化改革发展规划纲要), CENT. PROPAGANDA DEPT. OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, translated in Outline of the Cultural Reform and Development Plan During the National “12th Five Year
Plan”
Period,
CHINA COPYRIGHT & MEDIA,
http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/02/16/outline-of-the-cultural-reform-and-development-plan-during-the-national12th-five-year-plan-period (Apr. 4, 2012).
132. See Clifford Coonan, Cannes: Big Projects, Bigger Government Help China’s Animation Industry Advance, HOLLYWOOD REP. (May 14, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/cannes-big-projects-bigger-government-704077. Government support of the animation industries includes provision of millions of dollars in subsidies and preferential financing, banning
foreign cartoons from prime-time television broadcasts, and a broadcast quota of seven domestic cartoons broadcast for every three foreign cartoons aired. Mark Magnier, China Had To Import ‘Kung
Fu Panda,’ L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2008, 12:00 PM), www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-et-panda282008jul28-story.html.
133. See generally TARUN CHHABRA ET AL., GLOBAL CHINA: REGIONAL INFLUENCE AND
STRATEGY
1–4
(2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/FP_20200720_regional_chapeau.pdf (noting that China has many avenues through
which it seeks to build global influence).
134. See Felix K. Chang, China’s Encirclement Concerns, FOREIGN POL’Y RSCH. INST. (June 24,
2016), https://www.fpri.org/2016/06/chinas-encirclement-concerns/; see also, e.g., Derek Grossman,
Duterte’s Dalliance with China Is Over, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 2, 2021, 11:38 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/02/duterte-china-philippines-united-states-defense-military-geopolitics/
(describing how tensions over China’s military expansion in the South China Sea, among other things,
has caused Philippine President Duterte to abandon his “China-friendly policy” and “align the Philippines with the United States again”).
135. Ben Westcott & Nectar Gan, Xi Jinping Wants To ‘Make Friends’ with the World. But Beijing
Can’t Kick its Wolf Warrior Habits, CNN (June 2, 2021, 3:19 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/02/china/xi-jinping-beijing-diplomacy-wolf-warriors-intl-mic-hnk/index.html.
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Beijing.136 President Xi Jinping recently sought to rein in such self-inflicted
wounds, emphasizing the need to present “the image of a ‘credible, lovable,
and respectable China.’”137
China has therefore sought to enhance its global status through “soft
power”—attaining desired outcomes through attraction and persuasion rather
than force.138 Xi himself has recognized the importance of soft power as a
prerequisite to realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.139 Education, cultural dissemination, and the shaping of discourse through public
relations are key strategies for attaining soft power.140 China has invested tens
of billions of dollars into global educational and media initiatives designed to
increase understanding of and appreciation for Chinese culture.141 This includes more than five hundred Confucius Institutes China has funded at universities globally to promote Chinese language and cultural education.142 The
idea of influencing and attracting its neighbors through culture is natural for
China; it enjoyed a period of cultural hegemony in East and Southeast Asia
that lasted for two millennia.143 Nonetheless, China’s recent soft power initiatives—and its cultural policy generally—has too often been marred by topdown controls that prove counterproductive.144
136. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, U.S. Will Not Send Government Officials to Beijing Olympics, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/us/politics/olympics-boycott-us.html.
137. Westcott & Gan, supra note 135.
138. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE FUTURE OF POWER 20–22 (2011) [hereinafter NYE, JR., THE FUTURE
OF POWER].
139. See China Is Spending Billions To Make the World Love It, supra note 15. China’s 2021 fiveyear plan expressly calls for soft power initiatives.
140. See generally Joseph S. Nye, Jr., China’s Soft Power Deficit, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2012, 6:24
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304451104577389923098678842
[hereinafter Nye, Jr., China’s Soft Power Deficit].
141. Id.
142. See Pratik Jakhar, Confucius Institutes: The Growth of China’s Controversial Cultural Branch,
BBC (Sept. 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49511231.
143. China’s Culture Once Influenced the World, and It Can Again, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Dec.
4, 2012, 8:37 AM), http://en.people.cn/90782/8044241.html (suggesting that, prior to the twentieth
century, China’s cultural influence was much broader).
144. See China Is Spending Billions To Make the World Love It, supra note 15 (criticizing China’s
attempt to purchase goodwill overseas through cultural initiatives as undermined by a heavy-handed,
top-down implementation). For example, Confucius Institutes at universities across the United States
have come under fire by the U.S. State Department and ultimately closed over reports that the Chinese
government censored programming or induced faculty to self-censor to avoid losing funding by
broaching politically sensitive topics. See Elizabeth Redden, Closing Confucius Institutes, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-closechinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing; Naima Green-Riley, The State Department Labeled China’s Confucius Programs a Bad Influence on U.S. Students. What’s the Story?,
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Despite its cultural ambitions, China has remained a frustrated observer
in recent decades as Japan’s manga, anime, and J-Pop, India’s Bollywood
movies, and South Korea’s K-Pop and films became regionally and globally
celebrated, greatly enhancing those countries’ international status.145 Indeed,
when Korean rap artist Psy became a global sensation in 2012 with the hit
song Gangnam Style, supercharging foreign interest in Korean cultural products, many Chinese wondered: “Why couldn’t we come up with that?”146 Psy
was hardly a one-off success for South Korea’s cultural industries: Korean
cultural industries have produced a torrent of global sensations from musical
superstars such as BTS and Blackpink to highly acclaimed films such as
OldBoy and Parasite (the 2020 Academy Award for Best Picture winner) to
reams of popular television “K-dramas”—including the global sensation
Squid Game—on Netflix and similar streaming services.147 This has led to a
WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/24/state-department-labeled-chinas-confucius-programs-bad-influence-us-students-whats-story/. Australia and New
Zealand similarly clapped back at allegedly widespread, Chinese-government-backed influence campaigns in those countries targeting politicians, media, and universities. See Joshua Kurlantzick, Australia, New Zealand Face China’s Influence, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Dec. 13, 2017, 1:04 PM),
https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/australia-new-zealand-face-chinas-influence.
145. See Chee Yik-wai, For Chinese Culture To Be a Global Hit, Beijing Has To Learn from Japan’s J-Pop and South Korea’s Hallyu, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 21, 2021),
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/asia/article/3152926/chinese-culture-be-global-hit-beijinghas-learn-japans-j-pop?utm_medium=email&utm_source=cm&utm_campaign=enlz-globalimpact&utm_content=20211112&tpcc=enlz-globalimpact&UUID=%5BUUID%5D&next_article_id=3147354&module=tc_12; Victoria Kim, How South
Korea’s Music, TV, and Films Were Primed for the Viral Moment, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2022),
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2022-02-10/how-south-koreas-cultural-exports-wereprimed-for-the-viral-moment. Mainland China similarly remained largely on the sidelines as Hong
Kong dominated regional film markets in the 1970s and 1980s and launched global stars such as Bruce
Lee and Jackie Chan, and Taiwan’s “Second New Age” directors, such as Ang Lee, won global audiences in the 1990s, culminating in the commercial and critical triumph of Crouching Tiger, Hidden
Dragon (2000), which shattered U.S. box office records for a foreign-language film and garnered a
bevy of international prizes, including four Oscars. See Richard James Havis, Hong Kong Martial
Arts Cinema, Starring Bruce Lee, Jackie Chan, Jet Li and Donna Yen: Everything You Need To Know,
S. CHINA MORNING POST (May 28, 2020, 7:00 PM), https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/entertainment/article/3086541/hong-kong-martial-arts-cinema-starring-bruce-lee-jackie (highlighting the accomplishments of Hong Kong martial art films, especially wuxia films); Justin Chang & Glenn Whipp,
‘Gladiator’ Was About To Win the Oscar 20 Years Ago. What Those Awards Foretold, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2021, 4:03 AM), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/movies/story/2021-03-21/oscars-2001-critics-gladiator-traffic-crouching-tiger-hidden-dragon.
146. Evan Osnos, Why China Lacks Gangnam Style, NEW YORKER (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/evan-osnos/why-china-lacks-gangnam-style.
147. See Kim, supra note 145; Eun-Young Jeong, Why BTS Runs the World, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12,
2020, 7:47 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bts-cover-story-interview-be-new-album-dynamite11605114374; Lucas Shaw, Blackpink Is the Biggest Pop Band in the World, A First For South Korea,
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soft-power bonanza for South Korea that China can only dream of. As one
powerful South Korean entertainment executive put it, “Korea’s always been
obsessed with soft power, with having a voice in the world. After ‘Parasite,’
we thought, it’s our time.”148
Equally galling has been the success of foreign filmmakers presenting
stories based on Chinese folklore, including Disney’s Mulan and DreamWorks’s Kung Fu Panda.149 Once again, many Chinese wondered, “Why
couldn’t we have done that? Can’t we tell our own stories better than Hollywood can?” 150 Why did it take a foreigner to tell China’s stories to the
world?151
It is no secret that many in China believe China can, and should, be restored to its golden days as a dominant cultural force exerting hegemonic influence over the region and beyond.152 Many recognize the importance of
achieving this outcome, including top-level leaders in China’s government,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/pop-star-ranking/2020-november/blackpink-is-the-biggest-pop-band-in-the-world-a-first-for-south-korea.html; Andrew R. Chow,
Parasite’s Best Picture Oscar Is Historic. Is This the Beginning of a New Era in Film?, TIME (Feb. 9,
2020, 11:57 PM), https://time.com/5779940/parasite-best-picture-oscars/; Kat Moon, Best Korean
Dramas To Watch on Netflix, TIME (May 12, 2020, 10:19 AM), https://time.com/5835519/best-korean-dramas-netflix/.
148. Kim, supra note 145 (quoting Hyun Park of Studio Dragon).
149. See Maureen Fan, ‘Kung-Fu Panda’ Hits a Sore Spot in China, WASH. POST (July 12, 2008),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/11/AR2008071103281.html (“The
blockbuster success of an American animated movie that’s set in ancient China, highlights Chinese
culture, mythology, and architecture, and stars a kung fu fighting panda has filmmakers and ordinary
Chinese wondering: Why wasn’t this hit made . . . in China?”).
150. See id.; Amy Qin & Amy Chang Chien, Imagined as a Blockbuster in China, ‘Mulan’ Fizzles,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/world/asia/mulan-china-debut.html (noting the film Mulan had a poor box office reception in China and was criticized by Chinese
audiences and the state press for historical inaccuracies and being “too Westernized”).
151. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 149. Even Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon’s selection for Best
Foreign Language Film at the 2001 Academy Awards was only a partial win for China’s soft power
ambitions, since the Oscar was awarded to Taiwan despite the film being a collaboration with Mainland Chinese actors and production companies and based on a novel by a Beijing-born author. See
Awards: Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, IMDB.COM, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0190332/awards/?ref_=tt_awd (last visited Mar. 10, 2022).
152. See Ondřej Klimeš, China’s Cultural Soft Power: The Central Concept in the Early Xi Jinping
Era (2012–2017), 2017 AUC PHILOLOGICA 127, 131–32 (2017) (“The interrelation of culture, ideology, and propaganda in the contemporary Chinese party-state is not new in Chinese politics. The idea
that political power derives from cultural and moral authority has been present in China’s diplomacy
and governance since its early beginnings. A constructed cultural, political, and historical identity of
Chinese civilization (Huaxia 華夏) generated a sense of superiority over surrounding states, which
were expected to ‘come and be transformed’ (laihua 來化) by the superior culture of the central polity.”); China Is Spending Billions To Make the World Love It, supra note 15.
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yet much consternation remains over how it can be done.153
C. Why Emphasize Copyright as an Instrument of Development in China?
Copyright might be a less-than-obvious policy tool for helping China
achieve its forward-looking development goals. Developing countries often
regard intellectual property with suspicion.154 They view it as a tool of economic and cultural imperialism developed by and biased toward the interests
of rich nations; thus, they see it as likely to hinder rather than help development.155 To the extent development strategies do emphasize intellectual property, they usually focus on technological innovation and development of patentable technologies. 156 One might question, therefore, the benefit of
diverting attention and resources to copyright industries, which are often regarded as producing frivolous entertainment goods rather than anything at the
vanguard of global development.
These views reflect outdated assumptions about copyright’s contributions
to economic development.157 IP and innovation-oriented development strategies need not be constrained to technological development and patents.158 In
many ways, cultural industries provide a more advantageous and efficient instrument of development—copyright protection is immediately available
worldwide without the entry barriers (cost and time) associated with obtaining
patent protection.159 The technologies required for cultural innovation also
impose a lower bar.160 Digital tools have radically lowered the entry barriers

153. See, e.g., Westcott & Gan, supra note 135; Michael Keane, Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF
CULTURAL AND CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IN CHINA, supra note 98, at 4–5.
154. See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, The Limits of International Copyright Exceptions for Developing
Countries, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 689, 697–99 (2019).
155. See Sean A. Pager, The Role of Copyright in Creative Industry Development, 10 L. & DEV.
REV. 521, 523–24 (2017) (stating that “[c]opyright skeptics . . . see copyright enforcement as both a
futile endeavor and one that imposes unacceptable costs on speech, innovation, and information
flows”).
156. See Sean A. Pager, Accentuating the Positive: Building Capacity for Creative Industries into
the Development Agenda for Global Intellectual Property Law, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 223, 240
(2012).
157. See id. at 240–47.
158. Id. at 241–42 (citations omitted) (“Even developing countries that do not stand to benefit from
patent protection should therefore consider alternative means to foster [] innovation, whether through
utility model protection, trade secret law, or sui generis schemes. Even trademark law and geographic
indications protection have a place in innovation policy.”).
159. Id. at 240–43.
160. See id. at 240–41.
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to cultural production.161 Digital distribution enables producers in developing
nations to reach a global audience with speed and affordability unimaginable
in previous decades.162
Cultural industries based on copyright have been important economic
drivers in developing countries.163 Equally important, strong cultural industries generate noneconomic benefits as well.164 They, and their cultural endproducts, become sources of pride, identity, and shared meaning that enhance
national unity.165 As noted, successful cultural exports can serve as vehicles
for the “soft power” influence that China desperately seeks.166 Finally, investing in vibrant cultural industries can stimulate democratic discourse and popular imagination that confers the broader benefits discussed above in helping
China dream its national dream.
Some might accept these benefits of domestic cultural industries but
doubt the wisdom of relying on copyright as a policy tool to sustain them.
Many in the West perceive copyright as anything but forward-looking, considering it an obsolete relic rooted in scarcity economics with little to contribute to a networked world based on openness, not exclusion.167 Lastly, even if
copyright were a valid and significant development tool for the twenty-first
century, China, with its reputation for poor intellectual property rights enforcement, may seem an especially poor fit for such a strategy.168 Indeed,
some posit that China’s own culture industries, which have long contended
with widespread disregard for their copyrights, are already at the bleeding
edge of what cultural production will look like in a post-scarcity world.169

161. See id. at 242–43.
162. Id. at 245.
163. Id. at 244–45.
164. Cf. id. at 265–66 (outlining the noneconomic costs of rampant piracy in countries with limited
copyright protections).
165. See id. at 244; Priest, Copyright Extremophiles, supra note 88, at 526–29.
166. See supra notes 138–47 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 482–510
(2015) (arguing that the justifications for intellectual property, including copyright, are far weaker in
a post-scarcity, digitally networked world); Eric R. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive
Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623 (2011) (arguing that there is no longer any “broad necessity for
incentives for intellectual labor” and that “innovative and creative activity [can] thrive without artificial support” from copyright laws).
168. See Priest, Copyright Extremophiles, supra note 88, at 472–81; see also ANDREW C. MERTHA,
THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2005).
169. See, e.g., LUCY MONTGOMERY, CHINA’S CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: COPYRIGHT, SOCIAL
NETWORK MARKETS AND THE BUSINESS OF CULTURE IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2010); CHRIS ANDERSON,
FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE (2009); Priest, Copyright Extremophiles, supra note 88, at
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Why would China take a putative step backwards and foreground copyright
law as a development strategy?170
Yet, such copy-skeptical accounts overstate the extent to which China’s
content industries actually thrive in a high-piracy environment.171 Even as
observers around the world extol China’s supposed success at innovating in
copyright’s absence,172 many in China have already moved beyond its pirate
past and embraced copyright. Chinese stakeholders have made copyright their
business model on which to build future growth.173 “China is already the most
IP-litigious society in the world,” with the highest number of annual copyright
lawsuits filed per capita.174 Notably, only 2% of intellectual property cases in
China involve foreign parties.175 Far from viewing copyright as an outmoded
regime imposed by rent-seeking foreigners, local stakeholders see value in
obtaining and enforcing these rights.176 Major Chinese technology companies
such as Tencent, Alibaba, Baidu, and Huawei view copyright ownership as
central to their business models going forward.177 In recent years, major Chinese video-streaming sites have spent up to half their total annual budgets on

506–11 (canvassing arguments that endemic piracy is actually aiding the Chinese music and film industries); Glyn Moody, E-Publishing The Chinese Way: Very Fast And Very Cheap, TECHDIRT: CASE
STUDIES (Nov. 18, 2011, 5:36 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/blog/casestudies/articles/20111108/11225716681/e-publishing-chinese-way-very-fast-very-cheap.shtml
[hereinafter
Moody, E-Publishing the Chinese Way] (asserting that it is “great to see publishers moving on from
tired arguments about piracy” and beginning to spend money on investing in “new business models”
rather than “lobbying for new laws to defend old monopolies”).
170. See Moody, E-Publishing the Chinese Way, supra note 169 (“Increasingly, publishers are joining the music and film industries in bemoaning the effects of piracy on the sales of digital products
and some are even starting to sue people for alleged copyright infringement (because that has worked
so well elsewhere[]). Perhaps they should take a look at what is happening in China: instead of whining about e-book sales ‘lost’ to piracy[;] publishers there have come up with a business model that
embraces the possibilities of the [i]nternet.”); Glyn Moody, One Area Where China Should Definitely
Stop Ripping Off the West: Copyright Law, TECHDIRT (May 18, 2012, 5:27 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120511/03080718876/one-area-where-china-should-definitelystop-ripping-off-west-copyright-law.shtml#_jmp0_ [hereinafter Moody, China Should Stop Ripping
Off the West].
171. See generally Priest, Copyright Extremophiles, supra note 88 (arguing that although some creators in markets with weak copyright enforcement, such as China, may become adept at surviving
economically, surviving is not the same as thriving).
172. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY, supra note 169; Moody, China Should Stop Ripping Off the West,
supra note 170; ANDERSON, supra note 169, at 199–201.
173. See Priest, Meet the New Media, supra note 125, at 1089–92.
174. Priest, Copyright Extremophiles, supra note 88, at 479–80.
175. Id. at 480.
176. See id. at 479–81.
177. See Priest, Meet the New Media, supra note 125, at 1090.
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acquiring exclusive licenses for professionally produced films and television
programs in order to attract the most lucrative advertising contracts and distinguish their services from, and gain an advantage over, competitors.178 As
exclusive rights holders, these entities have become stakeholders aligned with
content producers in the copyright ecosystem, purging their sites of unlicensed
content in the process. 179 Cutting-edge e-publishing platforms, such as
Cloudary.com, are also sold on copyright.180 As soon as they identify an author with promise, they acquire her copyrights in order to license them to film
and video game producers.181
Many in China—including many (but not all) in the government—recognize that the nation’s cultural narratives and identity are sorely lacking at a
time when they have never been more important to China’s international and
domestic affairs.182 As noted above, improving and managing China’s international reputation by cultivating soft power has become a key government
strategy in recent years.183 Improving domestic morale and quality of life has
become equally important.184 As China’s economy matures and the standard
of living rises, the society’s persistent obsession with financial success and
material acquisition185 has sown feelings of confusion and purposelessness
among many in Chinese society—particularly youth.186 China has reached a
stage of development at which materialism ceases to be a compelling national
narrative, and many seek more enriched cultural narratives and a more

178. See Eric Priest, Acupressure: The Emerging Role of Market Ordering in Global Copyright
Enforcement, 68 SMU L. REV. 169, 171 (2015).
179. Id. at 226.
180. See Priest, Meet the New Media, supra note 125, at 1090.
181. See Liu Xiangrui, Big-Screen Dreams for Online Novelists, CHINA DAILY USA (July 9, 2014,
7:26 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-07/09/content_17688897.htm; Helen Sun, How
Freemium Self-Published Fiction Is Taking over China, PUBL’G PERSPS. (Nov. 1, 2011), http://publishingperspectives.com/2011/11/freemium-self-published-fiction-china/.
182. See SCHELL & DELURY, supra note 16, at 398–99; Nye, Jr., China’s Soft Power Deficit, supra
note 140.
183. See Eleanor Albert, China’s Big Bet on Soft Power, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Feb. 9, 2018,
7:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-big-bet-soft-power.
184. See CARL MINZNER, END OF AN ERA: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN REVIVAL IS
UNDERMINING ITS RISE 53–66 (2018).
185. See id.
186. See, e.g., FENGSHU LIU, URBAN YOUTH IN CHINA: MODERNITY, THE INTERNET AND THE SELF
192–93 (2010); Evan Osnos, A Collage of Chinese Values, NEW YORKER (Mar. 21, 2012),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/evan-osnos/a-collage-of-chinese-values; David Pilling, Modern
China
Yearns
for
New
Moral
Code,
FIN.
TIMES
(Nov.
2,
2011),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/513c85a2-0544-11e1-b8f4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz38VxAh2KV.
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meaningful cultural identity.187
China’s creative industries could fill this void. Yet, to date, domestic production has fallen short of meeting the challenge of the moment. A primary
response of the creative industries has been to recover and repurpose Chinese
classics or produce Chinese historical dramas because they are unambiguously and reassuringly “Chinese” and are seen as ideologically and politically
“safer” than stories rooted in modern Chinese society.188 Thus, seemingly
endless Chinese video games, films, and television series reimagine “The
Three Kingdoms,” “Journey to the West,” stories about Tang Dynasty magistrate Di Renjie, and other staples of Chinese traditional culture.189 Domestically, such themes still resonate.190 Domestic film franchises based on classical literature and historical source material have been box-office smashes.191
Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with going back to the well of
dependable favorites; Hollywood is equally fond of superhero reboots.192 But
it is problematic when the repurposing arises not for creative or commercial
reasons but because creators are restricted to a narrow sphere of politically
orthodox subject matter.193 When a system constrains creators so, it is less

187. See generally Pilling, supra note 186; Li Yuan, ‘Who Are Our Enemies?’: China’s Bitter Youth
Embrace Mao, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/08/business/chinamao.html (describing how many Chinese young people, disenchanted with materialism, have turned
to Maoism as a form of “spiritual relief”).
188. See Javier C. Hernández & Joy Dong, China’s Communist Party Turns 100. Cue the (StateApproved) Music, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/01/arts/china-communist-party-music-theater-dance.html (“Many artists have little choice but to comply with the government’s demands for more patriotic art, with officials in China’s top-down system wielding considerable influence over decisions about financing and programming.”).
189. See, e.g., Coonan, supra note 132 (“Sporting a $40 million budget, Kong, [a Chinese-produced
feature-length animation], is the latest movie or television property to be adapted from the classical
Chinese novel Journey to the West. The film will tell the origin story of the titular character, who was
born from molten rock in the Earth’s core, but will also feature sci-fi elements, including aliens and
robots.”).
190. See Remakes of Classics—Salute to Original Story or Lack of Creativity?,
CHINADAILY.COM.CN
(Mar.
15,
2018,
3:24
PM),
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201803/15/WS5aaa1faba3106e7dcc141e10.html.
191. See id. (“Recent years have seen literary classics such as Journey to the West being frequently
remade. The adaptations, relying on the popularity of the former series, usually churn[] out good
ratings.”).
192. See Melia Robinson, James Franco Explains Why Studios Keep Remaking Superhero Films,
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 19, 2013, 10:15 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/why-studios-keepremaking-superhero-films-2013-6.
193. See Klimeš, supra note 152, at 145–46 (“The credibility of the CPC’s cultural rhetoric is . . .
compromised by the fact that the party keeps exerting concerted efforts at curtailing cultural expression that conflicts with its political interests. . . . Despite all its assertions of innovation and reform in
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likely to yield the ambitious, pioneering creativity that heralds a country’s arrival as a global cultural power.194 In the words of one Chinese diplomatturned-professor, continually repurposing traditional culture under such circumstances demonstrates a “poverty of thought” in China.195
For China to actualize its Dream, its cultural gaze needs to be directed at
least partly forward, not backwards, and its storytellers need to confront unflinchingly the realities of its present, rather than finding refuge in escapism.196 As noted, censorship poses an obstacle to realizing these ideals, but it
need not pose an insuperable one. As we explain below, the problems with
China’s creative industries are partly structural, and developing a state-of-theart copyright system could help to overcome them.197
For all the enthusiasm surrounding China’s newfound embrace of copyright law, its institutions, infrastructure, and norms in this domain remain
comparatively underdeveloped.198 Yet, as we elaborate below, herein also lies
an opportunity: freed from the outdated baggage that hampers copyright regimes in other countries, China has a chance to “leapfrog” the status quo and
pioneer a twenty-first century copyright system that would advance China’s
national goals while serving as a model for the entire world.
III. OUTLINING A CHINESE COPYRIGHT DREAM
Accordingly, so long as China is dreaming up a vision of its future, we
suggest part of the Dream should include a dream of a reinvigorated Chinese
copyright law that sustains a vibrant copyright ecosystem. What would the
contours of such a Chinese copyright dream look like?
For many copyright owners outside of China, ever eager to further
the cultural sphere, the reality is that in the twenty-first century the Chinese party-state continues to
ban inconvenient artistic works and persecute critical artists in much the same way it has done since
the beginnings of its cultural governance.”).
194. See id. at 138 (arguing that the Party “sees legitimation as the most important function of culture, . . . [that] this legitimation is used to justify an unattractive non-democratic regime, and . . . [that]
the party monopolizes domestic visions of national culture and history, while simultaneously suppressing alternative interpretations”).
195. Nye, Jr., China’s Soft Power Deficit, supra note 140 (quoting Renmin University professor
Pang Zhongying).
196. Cf. Keane, supra note 67, at 132 (noting that Mainland television producers, for example,
“have a propensity to generate historical dramas, usually with a political message,” to the point where
producing such dramas has become China’s “niche”).
197. See infra Section III.C.
198. See Peter K. Yu, Third Amendment to the Chinese Copyright Law, 69 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. (forthcoming 2022).
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monetize that notoriously-hard-to-monetize market, the dream Chinese copyright system would doubtless start with higher damage awards for copyright
infringement, stricter enforcement, and far greater market access.199 These
goals have merit, but we argue that Chinese policymakers and copyright
stakeholders should look beyond such incremental adjustments.200 Moreover,
China need not take its copyright cues from foreign advocates who have their
own agendas. Instead, China has a chance to dream for itself a bold vision of
Chinese copyright in the twenty-first century.
As the previous Part outlines, China has signaled lofty aspirations for its
copyright industries. 201 Chinese leaders recognize that strong, productive
copyright industries can help achieve numerous domestic and global policy
goals, including increasing domestic consumption; further facilitating a transition to a green, sustainable, and high-value knowledge-based economy; and
enhancing China’s global cultural influence and soft power.202
Unfortunately, China’s current cultural and copyright policy lacks the
horsepower and vision to lift its creative industries to the heights necessary to
achieve these goals.203 Historically, international pressures and treaty obligations, and not China’s own needs and circumstances, have predominantly
shaped China’s copyright law.204 While this has helped China develop a sophisticated legal infrastructure in a short time, there has not been the time or
impetus for China to develop a copyright law optimized to its peculiar needs,
aspirations, and strengths.205
Further, Chinese cultural policy has long been hamstrung by ideological
control and censorship.206 China’s fourteenth five-year plan aspires broadly
to reach new heights in the production and global dissemination of Chinese
cultural products and the development of digital markets. 207 However,

199. See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 87, at 44–45.
200. See infra Part IV.
201. See supra Section II.B.
202. See supra Section II.C (discussing how strong copyright industries can help achieve these
goals).
203. See Suzanne Cords, China Introduces New Rule of Conduct for Artists, DW (Aug. 3, 2021),
https://www.dw.com/en/china-introducesnew-rules-of-conduct-for-artists/a-56772344 (showing how
the current restrictions on artists do not promote innovation in the creative industries, particularly in
the film industry).
204. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO
China, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 136–54 (2000).
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Priest, Copyright and Free Expression, supra note 33, at 6.
207. See Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) for National Economic and Social
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implementation plans lack specificity and vision.208 Moreover, China’s leadership still views cultural industries as destabilizing loose cannons to be reined
in rather than as drivers of economic growth and soft power to be unleashed.209
Indeed, at the time of this writing, Chinese cultural policy is more repressive
and inward-looking than it has been for decades.210
A cultural policy that threatens to discourage or stifle marginalized voices
dooms itself to mediocrity.211 The development of a strong cultural sector
requires voices on the margins as well as the mainstream, factory cultural producers.212 Often, the most disruptive cultural innovations that drive progress
come from marginalized groups on the fringes who, in an almost Schumpeterian sense, think outside the box, criticize and undermine the mainstream
paradigm, and found the new paradigm.213 China’s leaders should view such
expressive diversity as a source of strength rather than a threat to be subdued.
As we explain below, embracing a bottom-up conception of culture does not
mean that China needs to abandon its censorship regime or enforcement of
moral standards.214 However, it does require an acceptance that culture can
emerge through decentralized processes outside of the Party’s direct control
and the recognition that copyright provides the key to unlock this
Development and Vision 2035 of the People’s Republic of China, CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Mar. 13, 2021, 7:16 AM), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/202103/13/content_5592681.htm [hereinafter China’s 14th Five-Year Plan].
208. See !"#识产权局, 2020 $%&实施国家知识产权战略加快建设知识产权强国推进计
' [In-Depth Implementation Plan of the National Intellectual Property Strategy in 2020 To Accelerate the Building of an Intellectual Property Power], CHINA NAT’L INTELL. PROP. ADMIN., (May 2020)
[hereinafter In-Depth Implementation Plan] (mentioning copyright in just eight out of one hundred
action items relating to implementing China’s national intellectual property strategy). Several of the
copyright-related items in the 2020 national IP strategy implementation plan are standard fare, such
as “cooperate with the revision of the Copyright Law.” See id. at art. 23. However, as discussed in
more detail below, some entries are intriguing, such as Article 76 (“build an international copyright
protection trading platform”) and Article 81 (“promote the application of new technologies such as
artificial intelligence”). Id. at art. 76, 81.
209. See 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和 2035 年远景目标纲要
[Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social
Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035], art. 36, Sec. 3 (2021).
210. See, e.g., Fischer & Allen-Ebrahimian, supra note 82 (asserting that Chinese leadership’s aim
to make China a “strong film power” is now motivated more by a desire to keep out foreign culture
and control mass messaging than by a desire to foster global soft power).
211. See Sean A. Pager, Does Copyright Help or Hurt Cultural Diversity in the Digital Age?, 32
KRITIKA KULTURA 397, 400–01 (2019).
212. See id. at 402.
213. See id. at 401.
214. See infra Part V.
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decentralized paradigm.
Beyond this threshold commitment, China must develop a copyright law
tailored to its peculiar needs. To guide that process, we propose that modern
economic development theory—particularly the notions of leapfrog development and frugal innovation—provides a framework for articulating such a vision.215 Although by many measures China is not a developing country, its
copyright industries and copyright law are still developing. After all, at the
time of this writing, the PRC Copyright Law has existed for just thirty years
(as compared with England and the United States, for example, where it has
existed for centuries).216 Many aspects of Chinese copyright doctrine are still
in the early stages of development.217 And while China’s creative industry
growth over the past decade has been impressive, many of China’s copyright
industries remain undersized compared to those of smaller regional markets
such as South Korea and Japan, not to mention Western markets.218

215. See generally KEUN LEE, ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL LEAPFROGGING (2019),
https://www.unido.org/api/opentext/documents/download/16414872/unido-file-16414872.
216. See Priest, The Future of Music and Film Piracy in China, supra note 86, at 808 (noting that
the PRC promulgated its first Copyright Law in 1990).
217. See, e.g., Seagull Haiyan Song, Chinese Entertainment Law Year in Review, 2015: Is It Converging with U.S. Practice?, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 259, 262–67 (2016) (discussing important
copyright doctrines, such as substantial similarity and copyrightability of characters, that were heretofore underdeveloped in Chinese jurisprudence).
218. For example, China’s domestic recording industry revenue is a small fraction of South Korea’s,
despite that South Korea’s population is less than 4% of China’s. In 2019, China’s domestic recording
industry earned an estimated $490 million in revenues. See MUSIC:)ALLY, MARKET PROFILE: CHINA
1 (2020) (reporting estimated recording industry revenues of $591 in the Chinese market, of which
about 17% accrued to foreign copyright owners). This is substantially less than the annual revenues
of a single South Korean record label, Big Hit Entertainment, which earned $717 million in 2020. See
Glenn Peoples, Breaking Down BTS Label Big Hit’s 2020 Earnings, BILLBOARD (Feb. 23, 2021),
https://www.billboard.com/pro/big-hit-entertainment-bts-label-2020-earnings/. South Korea’s total
recorded music market is ten times greater than China’s. See Music Industry Sales Revenue South
Korea 2014-2019, STATISTA (reporting 2019 music industry sales revenues in South Korea of approximately 6.81 trillion South Korean won, or $5.7 billion). China’s domestic film industry revenue
(excluding exports) exceeds that of South Korea but is much smaller on a per-capita basis. See Patrick
Brzeski, China Retains Global Box Office Crown with $7.3B in 2021, Down 26 Percent from 2019,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 3, 2022) (reporting $6 billion in 2019 domestic box office revenues for Chinese-made films); The Rise of the South Korean Film Industry, STATISTA (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/chart/20781/south-korean-film-industry-rapid-growth/ (reporting $823 million in 2019 domestic box office revenue for South Korean-made films). Of course, export revenues
from Korean, Japanese, and Indian content industries, including television programs, films, comics,
and music, far outstrip China’s content industry export revenues.
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A. Leapfrogging and Frugal Innovation
Development theorists long believed that the road to development necessitates emulating all the steps developed nations took on their path to prosperity.219 Today, however, it is well recognized that emerging economies need
not play catch up in such a rote manner; they can tailor their development
strategies to their unique circumstances and leverage their distinctive
strengths.220 New technologies present opportunities to streamline development and leapfrog over costly, obligatory stages that developed countries
passed through in bygone eras.221 New business models and technologies may
be adapted to local circumstances, making them more useful and accessible to
local entrepreneurs and consumers.222
Developing countries can accelerate development by leveraging new
technologies to leapfrog traditional capacity-building and investment stages
(stage-skipping) and leveraging domestic innovation to forge novel, superior
solutions (path-creating).223 For example, some countries have successfully
used mobile technologies to skip the high-cost, resource-intensive stage of
building outmoded land-line telecommunications networks.224 The mobile
payment and banking solutions proliferating across the developing world exemplify path-creating leapfrogging by popularizing financial services that
outclass the aging credit card-based payment systems that dominate the developed-world financial industries. Path-creating leapfrogging enables governments to utilize latecomer advantages—a lack of entrenched interests and
no sunk costs in legacy infrastructure—to gain a competitive advantage over
developed markets.225 The Rwandan government, for example, “[r]ecognizing the opportunity to take advantage of the lack of legacy infrastructure or
incumbent [telecommunications] operators,” partnered with Korea Telecom
219. See Sandra Halperin, Development Theory: Economics and Political Science, BRITANNICA
(Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/topic/development-theory (explaining that the modernization theory of economic development held that development is a “sequence of stages through which
all societies must pass”).
220. See Jeffrey James, Leapfrogging in Mobile Telephony: A Measure for Comparing Country
Performance, 76 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 991, 991 (2009).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 993.
223. See Erol Yayboke et al., The Need for a Leapfrog Strategy, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUD. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/need-leapfrog-strategy; WORLD BANK GRP.,
LEAPFROGGING: THE KEY TO AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT? xvii (2017).
224. See KEUN LEE, CHINA’S TECHNOLOGICAL LEAPFROGGING AND ECONOMIC CATCH-UP: A
SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVE 33 (2021); Yayboke et al., supra note 223.
225. Yayboke et al., supra note 223.
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to deliver inexpensive, nationwide 4G mobile service in one-fifth of the time
it would have taken private industry alone.226 Latecomer flexibility allows
developing nations to build their policies, innovation ecosystems, and infrastructure around emerging technologies and advantageously position their entrepreneurs in the value chain that evolves around those innovations.227
States foster leapfrogging by adopting permissive regulatory policies and
a willingness to embrace experimentation.228 Policymakers should recognize
when they are uniquely positioned to take advantage of leapfrogging opportunities and bring their resources and regulatory power to bear.229 This may
involve promoting a bottom-up approach through public-private partnerships
and state investments in infrastructure and human capital.230 Such an approach may call for a light regulatory touch to “ensure that growth in new
technologies isn’t stunted by regulations meant for a different age.”231 For
example, the high cost and limited accessibility of banking services in Kenya
created an opportunity for Africa’s first mobile money service, M-PESA,
whose rise was aided by the Kenyan government’s deliberately hands-off regulatory stance.232 Alternatively, the state might use a heavy-handed, top-down
regulatory approach to steer the transition from sunset industry to new paradigm.233 For example, to accelerate the growth of China’s electric vehicle
(EV) market, the Chinese government has imposed strict sales quotas on all
automobile manufacturers in China, with the goal of having EVs make up
40% of all car sales in China by 2030.234

226. Id.
227. Id.; LEE, supra note 224, at 33.
228. See WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 223, at 108.
229. See id. (stating that retaining “flexibility” allows developing countries to capitalize on new
opportunities that are often outside of traditional development approaches).
230. Yayboke et al., supra note 223.
231. Id.
232. See WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 223, at 12, 99. Rwanda’s rise as a pioneer in drone technology is another example of experimentation and regulatory flexibility facilitating a leapfrogging
strategy. Yayboke et al., supra note 223 (“Rwanda has also been a pioneer in the adoption of drone
technology . . . . Rwanda’s policymakers helped to support the deployment of drone technology in
the country by ensuring that the nation’s regulatory systems remained flexible to accommodate the
needs of drone operators. . . . This more agile approach to regulation has reduced barriers for operators
and has given drone companies an open environment for testing and deployment.”).
233. See, e.g., Nancy W. Stauffer, China’s Transition to Electric Vehicles, MIT NEWS (Apr. 29,
2021), https://news.mit.edu/2021/chinas-transition-electric-vehicles-0429 (noting that to accelerate
electric vehicle adoption, Chinese regulators have imposed strict mandates on car manufacturers, requiring that a certain percentage of all vehicles sold by each manufacturer be battery powered).
234. Id.
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A related concept is “frugal innovation.”235 Actors in emerging economies faced with severe resource constraints often redesign business models
and technologies to reduce costs while increasing compatibility with local
needs and budgets.236 Like leapfrogging, frugal innovation involves eliminating extraneous features to optimize the innovation for local consumption.237
These efficiency gains can even result in net improvements to the original
innovation design by reducing needless complexity and increasing accessibility.238
B. Leapfrogging in China
Leapfrogging strategies are well-suited to advance the Chinese Dream
because, by definition, they involve looking beyond the well-trodden path and
embracing visionary possibilities. Indeed, China is no stranger to leapfrog
development. China’s mobile communications revolution is one oft-cited example. In the 1980s, China’s landline infrastructure lagged behind that of the
West, making it relatively easy to invest early and economically in the next
generation of telephony.239 Similarly, China’s lack of credit card systems and
providers allowed it to skip credit cards entirely, propelling the development
and adoption of next-generation mobile payment solutions.240 China has also
pulled out all the stops to promote leapfrogging in the green technology space.
Determined to reverse its growing environmental crisis, “China is well on its
way to leapfrogging the rest of the world in everything to do with a cleaner
environment,” including developing green technologies from electric vehicles
to renewable energy and enacting aggressive, pioneering policies designed to
transform polluting industries and stimulate new clean industries.241
235. See generally Timo Weyrauch & Cornelius Herstatt, What Is Frugal Innovation? Three Defining Criteria, 2 J. FRUGAL INNOVATION 1 (2016) (defining “frugal innovation” as the “develop[ment
of] products and services that fit [developing countries’] special needs and requirements” while remaining “cheap enough to give non-affluent customers opportunities for consumption”).
236. See Rebecca Richards-Kortum & Theresa Mkandawire, ‘Frugal Design’ Brings Medical Innovations to Communities that Lack Resources During the Pandemic, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 29,
2021, 8:07 AM), https://theconversation.com/frugal-design-brings-medical-innovations-to-communities-that-lack-resources-during-the-pandemic-147896.
237. See Weyrauch & Herstatt, supra 235, at 2.
238. See id. at 5.
239. LEE, supra note 224, at 35; Kaveh Waddell, China Is Playing Next-Generation Leapfrog with
the West, AXIOS (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.axios.com/china-ai-leapfrog-eba53d3b-1f47-49d9-bb4ce638d96bfcb2.html.
240. Waddell, supra note 239.
241. Henny Sender, China Is Leapfrogging the World When It Comes to the Environment, NIKKEI

769

[Vol. 49: 733, 2022]

The Chinese Copyright Dream
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

China is, of course, famously willing to use its powerful central authority
and economic planning to drive top-down innovation. As one observer notes:
“One of Beijing’s most powerful tools is . . . forcing companies to focus on
environmental, social[,] and corporate governance, which has become a major
catalyst for higher-quality growth, improving the standard of living for its
people . . . .”242 The Chinese government also frequently exhorts a unified
push by both state and private actors to leapfrog in areas of stated strategic
importance, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and big data development,
through the use of awards and subsidies.243
At the same time, the Chinese government has a history of taking a handsoff approach to facilitate bottom-up experimentation with new policies or economic models. 244 Indeed, as Kellee Tsai argues, China’s transition in the
1980s from a purely planned economy to one with free market elements was
driven primarily by local actors whose grassroots experiments with capitalism
were tolerated though they contravened formal law.245 Over time, as the experiments yielded positive results, formal market-oriented policies were
adopted and legal institutions changed accordingly.246
Several lessons can be drawn from this history. First, it shows the essential pragmatism of China’s leaders, who have embraced different policy approaches in different contexts. Second, it shows China’s willingness to experiment. Maria Repnikova observes that “Chinese governance involves a lot
of experimentation in policymaking processes. . . . [T]here’s no coherent
toolkit, no single textbook you could write on ‘how China governs.’” 247
ASIA (May 19, 2021, 12:05 PM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-is-leapfrogging-the-worldwhen-it-comes-to-the-environment; see also JOANNA I. LEWIS, GREEN INNOVATION IN CHINA:
CHINA’S WIND POWER INDUSTRY AND THE GLOBAL TRANSITION TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY 145–
67 (2012); Patrick M. Schroeder & Ralph B. Chapman, Renewable Energy Leapfrogging in China’s
Urban Development? Current Status and Outlook, 11 SUSTAINABLE CITIES & SOC’Y 31, 31–39
(2014); Stauffer, supra note 233.
242. Sender, supra note 241.
243. See, e.g., DEREK GROSSMAN ET AL., RAND CORP., CHINESE VIEWS OF BIG DATA ANALYTICS
6 (2020); Rachel E. Stern et al., Automating Fairness? Artificial Intelligence in the Chinese Courts,
59 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 515, 518–20 (2021) (chronicling China’s top-down push to integrate
advanced AI in the judiciary, and observing that “Chinese courts are plainly leapfrogging efforts elsewhere when it comes to AI, moving rapidly to a world where computers suggest legal outcomes to
judges, either by analyzing millions of past cases or through a decision-tree designed to match the fact
pattern in the case with the correct legal solution”).
244. See generally KELLEE S. TSAI, CAPITALISM WITHOUT DEMOCRACY: THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2007).
245. Id. at 50–60.
246. Id.; see also Priest, Copyright and Free Expression, supra note 33, at 62–63.
247. Freymann, supra note 39.
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Third, it shows a tolerance for internal contradictions that runs widely
throughout Chinese policy.248 Despite its widespread embrace of capitalist
policies, China has never abandoned its revolutionary commitment to communism. It continues to prop up state-owned enterprises and promulgate fiveyear central plans. China’s favored euphemism for its free market reforms is
telling: it refers to them as pursuing “Socialism with Chinese characteristics.”249
We argue that pursuing “copyright with Chinese characteristics” could
involve a similarly pragmatic accommodation of contradictory policies.
China is not about to abandon its censorship regime, and its authorities will
continue to occupy the commanding heights of cultural policy, issuing edicts
and enforcing red lines. At the same time, by loosening controls over cultural
production and encouraging grassroots experimentation by diverse voices
through a reinvigorated, more accessible, transparent, and fair copyright regime, China could arrive at a dialectical balance between top-down and bottom-up culture. Over time, as China’s cultural industries grow in confidence
and prestige and China gradually embraces decentralized markets for expression, the terms of this balance will continue to be renegotiated.
C. Sketching the Chinese Copyright Dream
So what would our dream of copyright with Chinese characteristics look
like? And how does it relate to our leapfrogging and frugal innovation framework?250 To begin with, we note that our vision calls for “legal leapfrogging,”
248. See Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L
L.J., 261 (2016) (“Contradictions pervade the Chinese economy today. While one might think of the
economy as state-dominated, private enterprises drive much of China’s dynamic growth. In addition,
economic intervention does not always flow through the state. Alongside the state is the Chinese
Communist Party, a separate political actor that plays an active role in the management of state-owned
enterprises. The economy embraces market-oriented dynamics, yet it is not strictly a free-market capitalist system.”). Similar contradictions operate in China’s approaches to its past as well, as current
leaders struggle to reconcile their commitment to revolutionary ideologies that rejected Confucianism
with a renewed reverence for China’s ancient heritage. See Wasserstrom, supra note 18. Such tolerance for internal contradictions is deeply rooted in Chinese philosophical traditions. See FUCHEN HU
& ZHONGHOU YAN, THE GENERAL THEORY OF TAOISM 97 (2013) (describing the Taoist philosophical
tradition of embracing complementary opposites: “Contradictions exist everywhere; these contradictions oppose and complement each other; this is the unity of the opposites.”); SCHELL & DELURY,
supra note 16, at 216 (describing Mao’s 1937 discourse, “On Contradiction,” in which he argued that
contradictions permeate the universe and it is this pervasive dialectical tension—a constant clash of
opposites—that drives progress).
249. SCHELL & DELURY, supra note 16, at 295 (quoting Deng Xiaoping’s famous formulation).
250. See supra Sections III.A, III.B (defining leapfrogging and frugal innovation).
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which differs in some ways from the physical infrastructure that development
economics typically focuses on. Modernizing China’s copyright law partly
requires enacting new law, an intangible good. However, other aspects of a
“dream” copyright system would require implementing technological systems
not that different from mobile payment or communications. 251 Moreover,
short of amending the Copyright Law, administrative and judicial officials can
effect broad, forward-looking changes to law and policy through Copyright
Law implementing regulations, “precedential” guiding cases, and judicial interpretations by the Supreme People’s Court.
1. Applying the Leapfrogging and Frugal Innovation Framework
Described Above
Stage-skipping: China is often perceived as playing catch-up to countries
with more developed copyright regimes. However, China’s industry and policymakers need not slavishly follow previous copyright development paths.
Legacy copyright regimes are beset with inefficient industry customs, rent
seeking, and path dependencies, much of which China still has an opportunity
to bypass. China can leverage its technological and political strengths to catch
up to “developed” copyright systems in other countries. Indeed, China’s technological strengths position it well to play a leadership role in reinventing
twenty-first century copyright.
Path-creating: China need not settle for “catching up” to other countries’
copyright regimes.252 It can leverage its unique strengths and capabilities to
surpass them in many areas and redefine the cutting edge of twenty-first century copyright.
Frugal innovation: Western copyright systems are plagued by baroque
complexities that have resulted from decades of incremental accretions ossified through a combination of path-dependency and vested interests. China
has an opportunity to streamline copyright law by reconfiguring it around the
needs of the present day.
China enjoys a combination of factors that position it to leapfrog and reinvent. First, despite recent growth, China’s copyright ecosystem has comparatively few entrenched stakeholders. Industry and the state thus enjoy
251. See Stern et al., supra note 243, at 520–33 (chronicling China’s cutting-edge use of AI in the
judicial system).
252. Cf. Yayboke et al., supra note 223 (defining “path-creating” development as “bypass[ing] traditional stages of development to . . . explore an alternative path of technological development involving emerging technologies with new benefits and new opportunities”).
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greater freedom to reimagine and reinvent copyright policy, practice, and doctrine without provoking opposition from vested interests. Second, China’s
powerful central government has the capacity to push a reimagined copyright
agenda. Third, China already boasts world-leading technological capabilities
in copyright-adjacent fields such as micropayments, blockchain, and smart
contracts.253
IV. SOME MODEST PROPOSALS FOR COMPONENTS OF THE CHINESE
COPYRIGHT DREAM
Central to our argument is that China’s next-generation copyright law and
policy should be for China and not dictated by foreign interests. In that spirit,
we do not presume to articulate what that law should look like. Nevertheless,
we make some proposals below, based on the aforementioned framework for
dreaming about a copyright law that would leverage China’s circumstances
and unique strengths to position its law and cultural industries at the global
vanguard.254
A. Be Bold in Reinventing and Reimagining Copyright Law for the Digital
Age
The Dream allegory is meant to inspire thinking beyond mundane, immediate constraints. The most recent Copyright Law amendments, issued in
2020, took eight years from first draft to promulgation but were probably most
notable for how little change they wrought.255 To be sure, the amendments
included several noteworthy substantive changes, including adding protection
for “audiovisual works” (to ensure live broadcasts are covered by copyright),256 a broadcasting right for sound recordings (something which still does
not exist in the United States),257 and provisions for increased damages awards

253. See China Using Blockchain Evidence for Copyright Infringement, LEDGER INSIGHTS (Nov.
29, 2019), https://www.ledgerinsights.com/blockchain-intellectual-property-protection-china/ (showing that China has recently been willing to use the “blockchain to protect writers and creative content
creators”).
254. See infra Sections IV.A–E.
255. See Yu, supra note 198 (noting the amendment was “quite conservative and not particularly
forward-looking” and “does not reveal much about the positions China will take in future international
norm-setting exercises”).
256. See 2020 Copyright Law, supra note 23, at art. 3.
257. See id. at art. 45.
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in infringement actions.258 Most of the amendments in the new law are welcome changes but are in the nature of tidying up the law (by codifying a smattering of intervening regulations) and catching up to global standards. Put in
the framing of leapfrog development, such catch-up strategies at heart
still assume that the economic configuration of developed
nations is the target to aim for. . . . These strategies rarely
show signs of considering whether developing countries
may have unique competitive advantages that would allow
them to forge their own development path via their own
unique version of leapfrogging. As a result, policymakers
are never prompted to explore how they might create an enabling environment for more disruptive, path-creating forms
of leapfrogging that allow new, alternative . . . systems to
take root.259
The 2020 Copyright Law amendments seem like a missed opportunity to
leapfrog and frugally innovate (that is, strip the law of unnecessary complexity). For example, finally recognizing a broadcast performance right for sound
recordings rectifies an important omission in the law, but the law still retains
the vestigial and discriminatory treatment of sound recordings as a lesser form
of work capable of protection only through neighboring rights, not copyright.260 This is completely disconnected from the commercial reality; sound
recording copyrights are far more valuable than composition copyrights that
receive full protection, but in China, the composition copyright has “always
been a misunderstood tag-along of the master recording” copyright.261 Indeed, as Robert Brauneis has argued, there are strong arguments for doing
away entirely with the archaic distinction between copyrights in sound recordings and musical compositions, and instead recognizing a unitary copyright in
music audio works. 262 Because the sound recording right is already

258. See id. at art. 54.
259. Yayboke et al., supra note 223.
260. See 2020 Copyright Law, supra note 23, at art. 42, 45.
261. See Rhian Jones, ‘Accessing Publishing Money in China Is Incredibly Complex. This is the
Beginning of a Marathon, Not a Gold Rush.,’ MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (July 16, 2020),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/accessing-publishing-money-in-china-is-incredibly-complex-this-is-the-beginning-of-a-marathon-not-a-gold-rush/ (quoting Chinese music industry expert Ed
Peto and noting that publishing revenues account for just 8% of music streaming royalties in China).
262. Robert Brauneis, Musical Work Copyright for the Era of Digital Sound Technology: Looking
Beyond Composition and Performance, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 55–59 (2014).
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economically preeminent in China and the music publishing industry remains
underdeveloped there, China is ideally positioned to pioneer the creation of a
unitary copyright in music audio works. This leapfrog innovation would formally discard the complexities and transaction costs associated with having to
acquire two separate licenses for most sound recordings.263
There are other opportunities for leapfrogging through frugal innovation,
as well. For example, the PRC Copyright Law recognizes thirteen discrete
economic rights.264 By comparison, U.S. copyright law has been criticized as
needlessly complex in this regard, and it recognizes just five economic
rights. 265 Some commentators argue that replacing the vestigial, baroque
complexity of numerous overlapping rights with just a single, unitary economic right—the right of commercial exploitation—is a better approach for a
digital age in which technological change far outstrips the law’s capacity to
keep up.266 This approach would abandon categorization of rights based on
the nature of the use of technology enabling the use, and instead focus on the
act’s effect: is the use within the ambit of the copyright owner’s expected commercial exploitation?267 This would at the very least sweep away overlapping,
antiquated distinctions that are confusing in the digital age: is a digital stream
a reproduction, a distribution, a performance, a transmission, and a communication?268 If different licensees have control over the various rights, would a
potential user need to obtain a license from all of these overlapping licensees?269 As Daniel Gervais observes, “[p]rofessional users . . . want to be
authorized to perform commercial operations, (for example, a certain form of
broadcasting at a certain date) independently of what the actual technical requirements are for this operation to be successfully performed. Yet, today

263. See id.
264. See 2020 Copyright Law, supra note 23, at art. 10 (providing the rights of publication, reproduction, distribution, rental, exhibition, performance, presentation, broadcasting, communication
through an information network, filming, adaptation, translation, and compilation).
265. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 43 (2010).
266. Id. at 43–48; Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2005).
267. Gervais, supra note 266, at 11 (“What the rightsholder in a film wants is to control and presumably be paid for the broadcasting of the film, not the number of transient, ephemeral, other reproductions made, or the fact that the work is performed, communicated or transmitted by Hertzian waves,
wire, wireless networks or otherwise. Rightsholders care about such distinctions to the extent that
they represent or affect markets. Otherwise, the technical requirements for the use of their content are
irrelevant.”).
268. See 2020 Copyright Law, supra note 23, at art. 10.
269. See id.

775

[Vol. 49: 733, 2022]

The Chinese Copyright Dream
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

copyright focuses instead only on the technical nature of the use.”270 This is
not to suggest that a move to a unitary commercial exploitation right would
be easy or frictionless.271 The biggest challenge is to ensure that the definition
of “commercial use” is sufficiently broad to capture all uses that are commercially significant to the copyright owner.272 Commentators suggest, however,
that pursuing such an approach would reduce the burden of copyright on users
while safeguarding the commercial interests of copyright owners and simplifying the law.273
Of course, these might not be the right suggestions for the copyright ecosystem Chinese stakeholders wish to build. The point here is not to advocate
specific proposals but rather to highlight the breadth of options available given
China’s comparative advantage due to the combination of a strong central authority and a lack of entrenched incumbents, vested interests, and path dependencies.
While China is not devoid of copyright industry power players, they are
far fewer and less entrenched than their counterparts in developed copyright
systems. Recall that the PRC Copyright Law is just three decades old, and
the most powerful companies in China’s creative industries during that period
have been plodding state-owned enterprises.274 Private film and music company development is about a century behind the West.275 No “major” private
studios or record labels have emerged in China that could come close to rivaling the size and political clout of the Western majors. Where behemoths have
emerged in China—on the digital distribution side rather than on the content
side—regulators have shown the political will to impose drastic top-down regulation when necessary to improve the copyright ecosystem. For example,
when the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) deemed Tencent Music’s stockpile of exclusive music licenses anticompetitive in the music streaming space, it fined the company and forced it to nullify the exclusivity provisions in its agreements with record labels.276

270. Gervais, supra note 266, at 11.
271. See Litman, supra note 265, at 45.
272. See id. at 46.
273. Id. at 43–45.
274. See Keane, supra note 153, at 6.
275. See Zhang, supra note 98, at 107–08 (discussing policy reforms of the early 2000s that finally
enabled the lawful development of private enterprise in China’s culture industries).
276. Patrick Frater, Tencent Music Ordered To Unwind Exclusive Content Deals with Global Labels, VARIETY (July 24, 2021, 1:31 AM), https://variety.com/2021/global/asia/tencent-music-orderedto-unwind-exclusive-content-deals-1235026760/#!.
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B. Leapfrog into a Robust, Transparent Digital Licensing Environment
When people think about copyright challenges in China, enforcement is
usually the first thing that comes to mind. While endemic piracy has long
been an enormous drag on the copyright industries, equally problematic in
China is the relative lack of a licensing ecosystem that facilitates continuous,
diversified copyright revenue streams. Enforcement does not generate value.
Licensing, on the other hand, is copyright’s economic wellspring. Without
the infrastructure and business culture to support a sophisticated licensing
ecosystem, copyright owners will underrealize the value of their works regardless of how well enforced copyright is.277
Copyright’s ability to facilitate licensing is perhaps its greatest superpower. Licensing allows the copyright owner to give others the right to exploit the work while the owner shares in the economic value the work generates on an ongoing basis. It is a powerful and important arrangement because
it allocates rights to those in a better position than the copyright owner to
commercialize the work while ensuring the owner shares in the work’s economic upside.278 Absent the ability to license, the creator must either sell the
rights to the work outright, thus ending the creator’s economic relationship
with the work (often before the work’s value is known), or else attempt to
exploit the work herself—something creators are often not well equipped to
do.
Copyright licensing in China is still a relatively new concept. The traditional approach—and one that remains common—is maiduan （买断）, that
is, the upfront, outright sale of a work’s copyright to the commercializing intermediary. Licenses historically generated little income because pirated content, which competed with and undercut lawfully licensed content, was

277. See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries:
An Economic Perspective, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 457, 462 (2001) (“Copyrights do more than deter piratical
copying. They provide a contractual framework within which ownership rights may be organized and
transacted. This framework is particularly important for building modern creative industries . . . [that]
emerge from the artistic efforts of numerous participants . . . . Allocating rights to each of these
activities is a complex phenomenon that cannot readily be managed in the absence of a legal framework for copyrights. Therefore, even though developing countries may enjoy an abundance of creative
musicians and performers, they may not be able to convert that abundance into widely marketable
products without policy intervention.”).
278. Cf. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 45, 57–58 (2000) (arguing that a functioning, formal property
system enables an asset’s economic potential to be unlocked and controlled through commercial exploitation via networks of individuals).
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ubiquitous.279 It also often makes little sense for creators to license content
with the expectation of generating royalties, because transactions occur in a
low-trust, low-transparency environment.280 Creators do not believe they will
be paid accurately, if at all, once the work is exploited.281 Thus music, for
example, is largely viewed as a product with little intrinsic value because of
historic endemic piracy and the attendant monetization problems. In terms of
its economic value, music is viewed primarily as a platform to boost the artist’s celebrity, which can be monetized through appearances, endorsements,
and increasingly through online “tipping.”282 Music’s value as an asset that
generates ongoing revenue is of secondary importance. It has only been in
the past decade or so that licensing practices have begun to mature in some
Chinese copyright industries, such as streaming video, spurred by improved
online copyright enforcement.283 Still, licensing practices in Chinese copyright industries remain underdeveloped overall due to persistent transparency
issues and copyright industry players’ continuing discomfort with arrangements that involve ongoing royalty obligations.
While licensing practice has markedly matured in China over the past
decade, most of the licenses for valuable content have been acquired on an
exclusive basis.284 Exclusive licensing as it is presently practiced in China is
essentially an extension of the maiduan philosophy.285 Large online platforms
purchase an exclusive license with a single advance payment typically in lieu
of royalties.286 In music, for example, much-ballyhooed licensing deals struck

279. See Jones, supra note 261 (stating that, because of “the historical ubiquity of piracy in China,
[] licensing deals [aren’t] an easy win and getting royalty reports isn’t a given”).
280. See id.
281. One of the authors of this Article, when working some years ago as a producer in the Chinese
music industry, was advised by a friend and record label executive to never do a deal for royalties in
China. “Record labels will happily do such a deal with you,” the executive advised, “because they
know they’ll never pay you. You’re better off selling the copyright outright because it’s the only time
you’ll ever see any money.”
282. See Jiarui Liu, The Tough Reality of Copyright Piracy: A Case Study of the Music Industry in
China, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 621, 623 (2010); Jones, supra note 261.
283. Montgomery & Priest, supra note 124, at 346–54.
284. See id.
285. See Priest, Meet the New Media, supra note 125, at 1090 (discussing China’s emphasis on
exclusive licensing and how it is “also quite unique to China”).
286. Matthew Alderson, Music Royalties in China: Let Those Without Sin Cast the First Stone,
HARRIS BRICKEN (July 25, 2020), https://harrisbricken.com/chinalawblog/music-royalties-in-chinalet-those-without-sin-cast-the-first-stone/ (“China’s market for foreign music has been dominated by
exclusive deals granted to Chinese [digital service providers] in return for big advances for the major
labels.”).
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between the major Western record labels and Chinese internet giant Tencent
were exclusive licenses granted in exchange for ‘“minimum guarantee’ advances instead of royalties.”287 Because much copyright licensing in China’s
music industry is still just a single-transaction affair, streaming services lack
basic capabilities and infrastructure for usage tracking, reporting, and copyright owner data matching.288 Not surprisingly, the data transparency and usage-reporting adequacy of even major streaming services in China are reportedly a mess or nonexistent.289
This combination of exclusive licenses and maiduan philosophy leads to
numerous problems. First, creators and copyright owners are cut off from the
ongoing economic upside of their works’ exploitation. Second, copyright
owners lose the opportunity to disseminate their works widely through multiple distribution channels. Streaming services pay more for exclusive than
nonexclusive licenses, and because copyright owners are unable to make up
the difference in royalties down the road, their most economically rational
choice is usually to grant an exclusive license to one provider. Third, the
accumulation of exclusive licenses confers tremendous market power on one
or a handful of monopsonist intermediaries, as we discuss in more detail below.290 Fourth, music licensees have little incentive to improve their usage
tracking, reporting, and ownership-matching capabilities that would enable
royalty-based licensing, causing the present circumstances to be self-perpetuating.
Fifth, a lack of royalty income is partly driving many emerging music
stars to turn to virtual gifting—in effect, online tipping.291 It has become a far
bigger revenue source for most than any sort of licensing.292 Currently, Tencent’s music properties make over $1 billion per year, but two-thirds of this
revenue comes not from ad- or subscription-supported streaming music but
from virtual gifting during live-streamed performances, especially on

287. Jones, supra note 261.
288. See id.
289. Id.
290. See infra Section IV.E.
291. See Cherie Hu, Tencent Music Uses ‘Tipping’ To Rack Up Revenues. Why Aren’t Western
Music Streaming Platforms Doing the Same?, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/tencent-music-uses-tipping-to-rack-up-revenues-why-arent-western-music-streaming-platforms-doing-the-same/ (stating that Tencent’s “growing profit margins are riding the wave of China’s exploding media micropayment economy—which allows users to
‘tip’ their favorite . . . artists”).
292. See id.
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platforms such as WeSing (a popular karaoke app).293 The meteoric rise of
gifting solutions for artists is an example of leapfrogging, leveraging China’s
advanced mobile payment technologies to bond audiences to artists more
closely and allow fans to directly pay the artist rather than an opaque layer of
intermediaries.294 However, an industry whose revenue streams are dominated by virtual gifting—and average per-user revenue for music gifting platforms is presently twelve times higher than that of streaming subscription services in China295—faces serious limitations. Creator burn-out, born of the
legitimate fear of losing fickle fans if one is not constantly producing to remain atop social media feeds, takes a mental health and long-term productivity toll on artists.296 Moreover, tip-based models tend to pander to audience
heartstrings by focusing on star personalities rather than intrinsic content quality. This aligns poorly with China’s ambitions of creating globally appealing
culture. Nor does a plethora of attractive social media stars raking in millions
singing karaoke online do much to stimulate democratic discourse. Virtual
gifting thus cannot form the basis of a sound, forward-thinking cultural policy.
It evokes, rather, Ai Weiwei’s lament that too much modern Chinese art lacks
substance.297
A “dream” copyright environment would be structured instead to encourage the production of high-quality works by monetizing them directly through
transparent, sophisticated licensing that would obviate the need to rely on
online busking for income. Western copyright regimes are far from dream
systems, but it is nevertheless no surprise that most major regionally and globally successful artists hail from countries with strong copyright regimes (such
as the United States, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, and Sweden)
that reward long-term development of artists and investment in high-quality
works.
This is not to suggest that copyright licensing in developed nations is the
beau idéal. In the West, music copyright licensing in particular is an infamous
imbroglio littered with entrenched stakeholders and legal vestiges from the
analog age. A century of legislative sausage-making has resulted in arcane
music-licensing rules in the U.S. Copyright Act that a former Register of Copyrights called “utterly incomprehensible to most people, because over the
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See Jones, supra note 261.
296. See Taylor Lorenz, Young Creators Are Burning Out and Breaking Down, N.Y. TIMES (June
8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/08/style/creator-burnout-social-media.html.
297. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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years Congress has spliced and diced them, and then hemstitched them back
together.” 298 There are seven different licensing collectives in the United
States with which digital music streaming services must work.299 Each of
these adds an intermediary layer that introduces inefficiencies, delays, the potential for errors or corruption, and in most cases, administrative fees.300 To
make matters worse, none of them has an authoritative database that can be
used to match all sound recordings with the proper right holders of the underlying compositions.301 Therefore, music-streaming services such as Spotify
have delivered millions of streams for recordings that they licensed but for
which they had incorrect, incomplete, or nonexistent ownership information
for the underlying composition.302 This inefficiency led to years of litigation,
unpaid publishing royalties of tens of millions of dollars, and ultimately a major copyright law amendment that finally directed the establishment of a centralized database of music-composition-ownership information.303 Antediluvian concepts such as “mechanical royalties” (dating back to the time of player
pianos and gramophones) remain in the U.S. Copyright Act and must be paid
by digital-streaming companies for no reason other than that entrenched intermediaries exist to collect such royalties.304 The U.S. Department of Justice,
wielding eighty-year-old consent decrees, dictates every aspect of licensing
298. Ralph Oman, Going Back to First Principles: The Exclusive Rights of Authors Reborn, 8 J.
HIGH TECH. L. 169, 173 (2008).
299. See Eric Priest, The Future of Music Copyright Collectives in the Digital Streaming Age, 45
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 3 (2021) [hereinafter Priest, The Future of Music Copyright Collectives].
These are ASCAP, BMI, SESAC, and GMR (which collect royalties for the public performance of a
song, which occurs each time a user streams a copyrighted song), SoundExchange (which administers
compulsory licenses for digital radio and webcasting), the Mechanical Licensing Collective (MLC) (a
newly established collective under the Copyright Act that collects compulsory license royalties for the
“mechanical” right implicated in every stream), and the Harry Fox Agency (which administered
streaming mechanical royalties before establishment of the MLC and still does as a contractor for the
MLC). Id.
300. See id. at 29–36.
301. See id. at 12.
302. See id.
303. Id. at 13–14.
304. See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 231–32
(10th ed. 2019). U.S. music-streaming services currently pay mechanical and performance royalties
to music publishers, that is, the owners of the underlying musical compositions. Id. at 232. However,
current practice effectively merges mechanical and performance royalties because the royalties owed
for mechanicals are determined by subtracting performance royalties paid from an “all-in” rate that
includes both mechanicals and performance rights. See Priest, The Future of Music Copyright Collectives, supra note 299, at 41. Thus, in effect, streaming services could be paying one all-in “publishing” rate, but instead pay that amount as two royalties to support the collectives that developed
around those revenue streams. Id.
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and price setting by the two largest music licensing collectives, ASCAP and
BMI.305 And the United States is not the only territory in which music licensing is broken.306 No authoritative rights database exists anywhere to facilitate
payments by matching usage and ownership data for recordings and compositions. 307 Moreover, performance rights organizations around the world,
which collect royalties for the public performance of music on radio and television, via digital streaming services, and in live venues, are notoriously inefficient and nontransparent.308 It is not uncommon for it to take several years
for copyright owners to receive their due royalties.309 Moreover, lack of transparency in accounting and royalty reporting is endemic industry-wide, not just
in the collective licensing area.310
China, with virtually no such baggage, can leapfrog to the head of the
class and set the global gold standard for technology-enabled, twenty-first
century copyright licensing capabilities. With China’s advanced capabilities
in mobile payment systems, data management, analytics, and AI,311 it is positioned to develop the world’s first truly intermediary-free, smart, and transparent copyright registration, licensing, and royalty distribution system.
As long as we are dreaming, imagine the following dream scenario for an
independent music artist. She writes and records a song. To register and begin
monetizing it immediately, she uploads a digital file of the recording together
with basic ownership and identifying information to a free national copyright
registry via WeChat (China’s most popular social networking app that is now
305. See Priest, The Future of Music Copyright Collectives, supra note 299, at 20.
306. See Giuseppe Mazziotti, The Politics of European Online Music Rights, BERKLEE COLL. OF
MUSIC: MUSIC BUS. J., http://www.thembj.org/2011/12/the-politics-of-european-online-music-rights/
(last visited Nov. 14, 2021) (stating that the European Union’s “situation is more complex than [that
of the United States] since [the EU] does not have a single copyright system and the enforcement and
management of exclusive rights in musical compositions, music performances[,] and sound recordings
still take place mostly on a country-by-country basis—despite the international reach of the internet”).
307. See Mary LaFrance, Music Modernization and the Labyrinth of Streaming, 2 BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 310, 319–20 (2018).
308. See Priest, The Future of Music Copyright Collectives, supra note 299, at 29–30, 39; Tran
Ngoc Linh Tam, Music Copyright Management on Blockchain: Advantages and Challenges, 29 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 201, 210–12 (2019).
309. See Tam, supra note 308, at 211–12.
310. See Griffin Davis, Transparency in the Music Business, BERKLEE COLL. OF MUSIC: MUSIC
BUS. J., http://www.thembj.org/2015/08/transparency-in-the-music-industry/ (last visited Nov. 14,
2021) (“Of the issues that have bedeviled the music industry, perhaps the most insidious has been that
of transparency, or, more accurately, a lack thereof. In fact there really has not ever been a time when
the modern music industry, meaning the industry that developed around the distribution and use of
sound recordings, has been truly transparent.”).
311. See GROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 243, at 5–10.
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used in all facets of Chinese life from personal to professional to governmental).312 The registry uses blockchain technology to permanently record the
registration and creates a hash of the file for identification and antifraud purposes.313 The app asks her to select the streaming services through which she
wishes to make her content available.314 The work is now registered with the
National Copyright Administration of China and is simultaneously registered
with and made immediately available on all the artist’s selected digital platforms. A dashboard in WeChat allows her to monitor uses of the work in realtime. Platforms would know exactly whom to pay for the content and would
make micropayments directly to the artist’s app in real time every time the
work is consumed.315 If the artist has negotiated a bespoke deal with a platform, a blockchain-recorded smart contract containing those terms would be
appended to the registration, and royalties would be distributed accordingly.316
If there are multiple copyright owners, the system would distribute royalties
on a pro rata basis to each owner. 317 To ensure the actual creators of the
work—and not just their record labels and publishers—are paid, the system
could automatically impose a 50% split to creators akin to the 50% “writer’s
share” imposed by the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees in the United States,
or the guaranteed author’s share provided for in Indian law.318 The National
Copyright Administration would enforce service-provider accountability and
investigate anomalies. It would use AI to detect fraud on both the registrant
and platform sides. In this system, there is no intermediary taking a fee,
312. See Paul Mozur, Forget TikTok. China’s Powerhouse App Is WeChat, and Its Power Is Sweeping, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/04/technology/wechat-chinaunited-states.html (discussing the cultural prevalence of WeChat in China and the significant role it
plays in people’s everyday lives).
313. See China Using Blockchain Evidence for Copyright Infringement, supra note 253. Courts in
Hangzhou, Beijing, and Guangzhou are already experimenting with a similar technology, which allows copyright owners to upload and register their literary works or articles to a blockchain-based
database that automatically generates a string or electronic identification for the content. Id. The
blockchain record can then be used to definitively identify the work and owner for enforcement purposes. Id.
314. Cf. Sebastian Pech, Copyright Unchained: How Blockchain Technology Can Change the Administration and Distribution of Copyright Protected Works, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 10–
11 (2020) (explaining how a blockchain-based licensing registry could allow owners to clear rights
for access by potential users).
315. See Tam, supra note 308, at 220–21.
316. See id. at 221 (illustrating how artists and creators can negotiate deals and allocate distributions
directly through a blockchain-based system without the hindrance of “middlemen”).
317. See id.
318. See Sean A. Pager, Making Copyright Work for Creative Upstarts, 22 GEO. MASON. L. REV.
1021, 1044–45, 1044 n.142 (2015) [hereinafter Pager, Creative Upstarts].
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withholding payment, or applying skewed, black-box distribution formulas.
The system is frictionless, immediate, free, and totally transparent. Moreover,
in one leap it creates a viable, trustworthy licensing model. Indeed, it transforms China from a predominantly maiduan copyright culture to the most advanced music-licensing system in the world—a model for every other country
to follow.319
A state-of-the-art digital licensing ecosystem would advance the public
interest by more effectively and efficiently doing what copyright is designed
to do—support creative endeavors and thereby promote the progress of culture and knowledge by enabling creators to extract the value of their works
from the marketplace. But it could also advance the public interest by formally embedding into the system a public use licensing regime. Imagine if,
in the system described above, the creator could also optionally indicate open
access and public use permissions, similar to Creative Commons (CC) licenses, as part of the registration process.320 These permissions would be definitively recorded in the registration blockchain and automatically signal use
permissions to all platforms and users web-wide—far more definitively than
the ad hoc CC tagging functionality built into some Western search engines
and video sites.321 Guan Tang has argued that, although knowledge sharing is
an important aspect of both Confucian and socialist tradition in China, CC and
open access have failed in China largely because of a lack of top-down state
support.322 Including CC-like permissions in a national registration and rights
database would in one stroke embed open access more deeply and visibly in
Chinese copyright law than in any other copyright system in the world.
China clearly already has ambitions in this general direction. The 2020
implementation plan for the National Intellectual Property Strategy directs the
319. We understand that our simplistic example glosses over many complexities, including complexities arising from transnational licensing of works with one or more non-Chinese copyright owners. See Tam, supra note 308, at 215–17. We have little doubt these issues will be resolved eventually.
But more to the point, our objective is to inspire policymakers to dream without getting bogged down
in technical complexities, as doing so early on kills dreams. China can tackle these issues piecemeal,
focusing on domestic licensing first and then expanding later. The perfect should not be the enemy of
the good.
320. What We Do, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 10,
2022) (“Creative Commons licenses . . . give every person and organization in the world a free, simple,
and standardized way to grant copyright permissions for creative and academic works; ensure proper
attribution; and allow others to copy, distribute, and make use of those works.”).
321. About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited
Mar. 10, 2022) (detailing how web service providers including Google and Wikipedia use “machine
readable” CC licenses).
322. GUAN H. TANG, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN CHINA 36–37 (2011).
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State Administration of Radio, Film and Television to research, develop, and
implement AI and blockchain standards and technology in the copyright “industrial ecosystem.”323 It also directs the Central Propaganda Department to
develop a convenient national digital copyright registration system.324 The
extent to which the end result ultimately resembles the system we have
sketched above is unimportant. Our point, once again, is not to advocate a
specific solution but to inspire Chinese policymakers and industry to dream
up the ideal copyright system on their terms, with the knowledge that China
already has unique strengths and capabilities to build something close to that
ideal.
C. Make Copyright More Friendly and Accessible to Small Creators
China has an outstanding opportunity to lead globally in developing a
copyright system that works for small creators as well as big media. As one
of us has observed, “the copyright system has grown into an edifice of daunting complexity. Such complexity caters to sophisticated operators while systematically disadvantaging those who lack information and resources. For
those in the disadvantaged camp, transaction costs, rather than substantive
rights, often dictate outcomes.”325 That observation, though made about copyright in the United States, applies to copyright systems everywhere, including China. Because of the law’s intimidating complexity, small creators without legal expertise are easily taken advantage of and miss out on many of
copyright’s benefits, including access to justice when rights are infringed.326
The costs of copyright litigation to enforce one’s rights can be far too much
for a smaller creator to bear, making copyright’s benefits illusory.327 A severe
shortage of lawyers in China exacerbates the access to justice problem, underscoring the urgency to innovate frugally to streamline legal processes and to
develop leapfrog solutions that harness technology to increase access to justice.328 And indeed, just the burden of having to take off time to physically
323. See In-Depth Implementation Plan, supra note 208, at art. 81.
324. Id. at art. 18.
325. Pager, Creative Upstarts, supra note 318, at 1022.
326. See id. at 1024 (“[U]ndemanding formal entry requirements mask the reality of a copyright
system that is far from welcoming to the uninitiated.”).
327. Id. at 1029.
328. See Tianyu Yuan & Michael Wang, Where Is China Heading With Legal Tech?, ARTIFICIAL
LAW. (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2019/10/21/where-is-china-heading-with-legal-tech/ (“Because China’s legal services market is quite young, it suffers from a shortage of legal
professionals. As opposed to one lawyer for every 300 citizens in the US, there is only one lawyer for
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appear in court, the commute to which may take hours, can be a deterrence
for busy, struggling small creators. A copyright system that is prohibitively
complex, expensive, or inconvenient for small creators excludes an important
constituency in contravention of fundamental copyright goals.
China can leapfrog development of the law and the copyright ecosystem
in numerous ways to improve the lot of small creators. As noted in Section
IV.A, radically simplifying copyright law could have wide-ranging benefits.
The easier it is for ordinary creators to understand the law without the aid of
a lawyer, the more empowered they are and the more accessible justice becomes. 329 Small creators would enormously benefit from simplified legal
rules combined with an easily accessible, online registration system of the
type outlined in the previous Section. Such a system would be frugally innovative, bypassing the needless complexity of Western systems. In the United
States, copyright registration is deceptively complex—the two-page registration form belies the complexity of the doctrinal knowledge needed to avoid
pitfalls. Moreover, registration fees, which can range from $45 to $125 per
work in the United States, can impose a significant burden on struggling artists.330 China could leapfrog the U.S. registration system easily with a simple,
intuitive copyright registration form hosted in WeChat, which is installed on
virtually every phone in China and is exceedingly familiar to every user. This
would greatly lower the barriers for independent creators to formally participate in the copyright system. Moreover, the digital registration process could
be fully automated, with registrations examined pro forma by AI software,
eliminating the need for a fee and further easing the burden on creators.331
Building a state-of-the-art digital registration and licensing system would
also significantly ease the burdens that clearing copyright imposes on small
creators.332 Many forms of creativity build on and incorporate preexisting
copyrighted expression. Negotiating licenses for such preexisting works can
be a costly, time-consuming process. Indeed, the transaction costs entailed
merely to identify the relevant rightsholders to approach can be daunting. As
commentators have noted, because registration is not required in most

every 4,500 citizens in China. Thus, a major application of LawTech is to use technology to make
legal advice and proceedings accessible and affordable for ordinary citizens.”).
329. See Litman, supra note 265, at 43.
330. See Pager, Creative Upstarts, supra note 318, at 1029.
331. See generally Pech, supra note 314, at 22 (discussing potential AI applications for an online
copyright registration system).
332. See Litman, supra note 265, at 33 (detailing how “ordinary people” are burdened by arcane
copyright regulations and access barriers in the United States).
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countries, basic information as to who owns what is often hard to find.333
Even in the United States, which does incentivize registration more than most
countries, the primitive nature of the U.S. Copyright Office database makes
clearing rights a perilous exercise.334 Accordingly, copyright law often fails
the basic notice function that an efficient property law is supposed to ensure.335
A modern Chinese copyright registration system built around state-ofthe-art, AI-enhanced search capabilities would represent a vast improvement
over the status quo. If such a system incorporated the smart licensing and
payment distribution functionality envisaged in the previous Section, it would
leapfrog global rivals—and the U.S. registration system specifically—by light
years in terms of functionality and benefit to creators—small creators particularly.336
China also has an opportunity to leapfrog the West regarding access to
copyright justice.337 To have value as property rights, copyrights must be enforceable. However, for many individual creators and small creative businesses, the costs of copyright litigation—which can run in the tens to hundreds
of thousands of dollars or more—are prohibitive.338 Given that even in successful copyright litigation in China the average damages awarded are under
$10,000, the effort for the small creator seems fruitless.339 Awarding attorney
fees to prevailing plaintiffs in cases of clear-cut infringement could partly
remedy this defect.340 However, a more complete solution would require reducing litigation costs to begin with by streamlining the process.341 Since we
are dreaming, it is worth imagining the ideal system.
333. See, e.g., LaFrance, supra note 307, at 319–20.
334. See John Tehranian, The Emperor Has No Copyright: Registration, Cultural Hierarchy, and
the Myth of American Copyright Militancy, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1399, 1428 (2009).
335. Peter S. Menell, Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Notice and Disclosure, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 424 (Ben Depoorter
& Peter S. Menell eds., 2018).
336. See supra Section IV.B.
337. See Pager, Creative Upstarts, supra note 318, at 1029 (observing that the “the high cost of
litigating copyright cases in federal court disadvantages under-resourced creators”).
338. See Tehranian, supra note 334, at 1409.
339. See Priest, Copyright Extremophiles, supra note 88, at 477–78.
340. China’s Supreme People’s Court has recently authorized attorney fee awards to IP defendants
in certain cases. See Aaron Wininger, China’s Supreme People’s Court Clarifies That Defendant May
Be Entitled to Attorney Fees and Expenses in IP Litigation, NAT’L L. REV. (June 4, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/china-s-supreme-people-s-court-clarifies-defendant-may-beentitled-to-attorney-fees. The availability of plaintiff awards remains unsettled. Id.
341. See Litman, supra note 265, at 40.
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The United States attempted to address this problem with the Copyright
Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2019 (the CASE Act), which
establishes a small claims administrative tribunal system within the U.S. Copyright Office for copyright owners who seek damages under $30,000 for copyright violations.342 The CASE Act combines frugal innovation with leapfrog
elements that benefit creators. It provides for simplified procedures that the
average person could navigate without an attorney, greatly reducing costs.343
It also contains a progressive feature critical for access to justice: cases are
handled remotely, further reducing the cost and burden for both parties.344
However, the CASE Act contains a fatal flaw that greatly undermines its utility to small creators: due to concerns that an extrajudicial small claims tribunal
might be unconstitutional, the defendant cannot be compelled to participate;
her participation in the proceedings is completely voluntary.345
China is ideally positioned to take and improve upon the best features of
the CASE Act, while jettisoning its fatal flaw. China has experimented extensively with ways to increase access to justice, including “internet courts”:
virtual courts with proceedings held entirely online for matters arising from
e-commerce and other online activity, including online copyright infringement.346 Indeed, the first virtual court app, by which users could attend trials

342. 17 U.S.C. § 1504(e)(1)(D) (enabling a tribunal to hear claims for matters totaling $30,000 or
less).
343. See § 1504(a) (allowing voluntary participation in the proceedings in a wide range of courts
and forums).
344. See 17 U.S.C. § 1506(c) (“Proceedings before the Copyright Claims Board Shall—(1) be conducted at the offices of the Copyright Claims Board without the requirement of in-person appearances
by parties or others . . . .”).
345. Despite that participation is voluntary for CASE Act defendants, concern over CASE proceedings’ constitutionality remains and recent Supreme Court case rulings have heightened such doubts.
See Pamela Samuelson & Kathryn Hashimoto, Scholarly Concerns About a Proposed Small Copyright
Claims Tribunal, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 689, 691–97 (2018).
346. See Sandra M. Aistars, Ensuring Only Good Claims Come in Small Packages: A Response to
Scholarly Concerns About a Small Copyright Claims Tribunal, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 65, 83–85
(2018) (arguing that China’s existing Hangzhou Internet Court provides an instructive example for the
viability of CASE Act tribunals); Jason Tashea, China’s All-Virtual Specialty Internet Courts Look
Set To Expand into Other Areas of the Law, ABA J. (Nov. 1, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/china-all-virtual-specialty-internet-courts. We note that although Professor
Aistars asserts that in the Hangzhou Internet Court a defendant’s participation is voluntary, it appears
from our research that that may not be the case. See 杭州互联网法院诉讼平台审理规程 [Hangzhou
Internet Court Litigation Platform Trial Rules], at art. 16, https://www.netcourt.gov.cn/#lassen/litigationDocuments (providing that the defendant “may” within a specified period provide a response, but
the failure to answer “does not affect the law,” suggesting that upon the defendant’s failure to respond
the case proceeds ex parte and the court’s decision is binding on the defendant).

788

[Vol. 49: 733, 2022]

The Chinese Copyright Dream
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

from home via video call, submit court files, and give testimony all by
WeChat, originated in the Beijing Intellectual Property Court and has been
used in millions of trials, including, frequently, intellectual property trials.347
China is even experimenting with virtual AI judges who preside over remote,
app-based proceedings to address the shortage of judges in the legal system
and expedite relatively simple cases.348 The Hangzhou Internet Court already
provides a limited virtual tribunal for online copyright infringement disputes.349 But China could go further to create a specialized, national, virtual
copyright court incorporating the kinds of innovations we have discussed, and
in which participation by defendants would be mandatory and judgments
binding. All of these innovations would serve a copyright small claims court
well to facilitate expeditious, affordable, convenient justice. Moreover, as the
existence of the aforementioned cyber courts demonstrates, there is no constitutional or other legal obstacle to establishing new, specialized courts in
China.350 Such a court has the potential to be dream-like to a small creator
whose modest livelihood is threatened by infringement, offering precisely the
kind of accessible justice independent creators need to make their rights meaningful.351

347. See Tashea, supra note 346.
348. CGTN, AI Judges via Chat App: The Brave New World of China’s Digital Courts, YOUTUBE
(Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yuUN6VfWF-Q.
349. Aistars, supra note 346, at 83–85; Dani Deahl, China Launches Cyber-Court To handle Internet-Related
Disputes,
THE
VERGE
(Aug.
18,
2017),
https://www.theverge.com/tech/2017/8/18/16167836/china-cyber-court-hangzhou-internet-disputes.
350. See Cao Yin, World’s First Internet Court Goes Online in Hangzhou, CHINADAILY (Aug. 18,
2017), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-08/18/content_30770108.htm (noting the court’s
approval by “central leadership”).
351. We acknowledge that the use of AI in the context of the judiciary raises significant concerns,
including the reduction of judicial autonomy and discretion; the use of algorithms and context-poor
dashboard indicators to guide frontline decision-making; the exacerbation of access-to-justice inequalities that arise when only richer litigants have access to legal big-data consultants; and general concerns about the rise of an omniscient “techno-tatorship.” See Stern et al., supra note 243, at 547–53.
Nevertheless, the number of copyright cases filed annually in China is gobsmacking. In 2018 alone,
for example, a whopping 195,408 civil copyright cases were filed in China. See LIAOTENG WANG, A
JURISDICTIONAL VIEW OF CHINESE IP LITIGATION (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/Liaoteng-Wang.pdf#:~:text=Among%20the%20newly%20accepted%20cases%2C%20there%20were%2021%2C699,Has%20Been%20Experiencing%20An%20IP%20Litigation%20Boom%20www.beijingeastip.com. Many of these cases involve
simple copyright issues that are relatively easily adjudicated but clog up the judicial system. Using
AI algorithms to help resolve the simple cases, while human judges’ bandwidth is reserved for more
complex or higher stakes cases, could greatly increase judicial efficiency. Furthermore, the use of AI
in straightforward civil copyright cases raises fewer of the aforementioned concerns than, for example,
using AI in criminal cases of any kind.
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Finally, making copyright accessible to small creators may also require
developing additional support systems that empower creators to exercise their
rights effectively outside the courtroom.352 As noted, China suffers from a
shortage of lawyers, and legal fees, in any case, are beyond the budget of many
upstart creators.353 Even in a simplified copyright system, small creators may
struggle to negotiate and draft licenses or work-for-hire agreements.354 Here
too, technology can help. Computerized expert systems could guide creators
through a menu of choices, offering simple explanations as to the tradeoffs
between standardized options, helping them arrive at a solution tailored to
their needs while performing the legwork to implement the requisite language.355 China already has a wealth of legal technology companies who are
developing systems of this kind for high-frequency scenarios such as traffic
accidents and employee disputes.356
D. Embrace Leapfrog Technologies for Next-Generation Copyright
Enforcement
The area in which China seems most intentional about technological leapfrogging at present is enforcement. This is unsurprising since ineffective copyright enforcement has long been number one on the list of complaints by
both international and domestic copyright owners. In the 2000s, most content,
whether online or in physical form, was piratical. Today, virtually all content
is distributed and consumed online, and far more is authorized than ever before.357
The improved enforcement environment, however, has partially come at
a steep long-term cost to the copyright ecosystem. As noted in Section IV.B
above, most content licenses in China are exclusive. This practice has the

352. See Pager, Creative Upstarts, supra note 318, at 1021–23.
353. See Jun Mai, Xi Jinping Says China Has a Legal Problem: Finding the Lawyers To Defend Its
Interests
Abroad, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar.
1,
2021,
9:00
AM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3123130/xi-jinping-says-china-has-legal-problem-finding-lawyers-defend?module=perpetual_scroll&pgtype=article&campaign=3123130 (noting
China’s “lack of legal talent”).
354. See Pager, Creative Upstarts, supra note 318, at 1027–28.
355. See id. at 1051–52 (stating that the “next step” in establishing an effective and equitable copyright system is “to design software that goes beyond offering advice and actively assists [inexperienced creators] with copyright transactions”).
356. See Yuan & Wang, supra note 328.
357. See Priest, Meet the New Media, supra note 125, at 1082–92 (discussing the rapid acceleration
of digital content licensing and copyright enforcement in China).
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drawbacks discussed above but one short-term, major benefit: it aligns the
interests of copyright owners with distribution platforms (e.g., music streaming services, streaming video platforms, and e-publishing platforms) who are
predominantly exclusive licensees. 358 Because exclusive licensees invest
steep, sunk, upfront costs to acquire exclusive rights in attractive content that
they expect to give them a competitive edge, they are motivated to scour the
web for infringements and have the legal resources to eliminate them. 359
These exclusive licensees—mostly Chinese internet behemoths—can marshal
in their enforcement efforts technical expertise, war chests, and political clout
that copyright owners could only dream of.360 Many copyright owners have
celebrated the fact that they finally have major internet companies as enforcement agents in China. But as noted above, a copyright ecosystem dominated
by exclusive licenses will ultimately suffer from stunted development. 361
Eventually, China’s copyright system must transition to a nonexclusive-license-dominant system—indeed, regulators have already moved to quash exclusive licensing in the music space.362 At that time, much of the enforcement
burden will fall back on copyright owners, who will have to rely on an enforcement environment capable of delivering consistent, meaningful results
without the aid of internet behemoths. Moreover, even in the age of exclusive
licensing and digital platform enforcement efforts, stubborn pockets of infringement that cost copyright owners billions still pepper the Chinese web.363
Accordingly, a dream enforcement environment still remains an important aspiration in China.364
China has made technological leapfrogging in the enforcement space a
strategic priority tied to broader state efforts to advance capabilities in blockchain, smart contracts, and AI. 365 The 2020 Implementation Plan for the

358. See Montgomery & Priest, supra note 124, at 347–48.
359. Id.
360. See id. at 348.
361. See supra Section IV.B.
362. See supra note 276 and accompanying text; see also Frater, supra note 276.
363. See Qian Chen, Plagiarism Is Rampant in China, and Its Media Companies Are Raking in
Billions, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2018, 9:27 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/23/ip-plagiarism-is-rampant-in-china-and-media-companies-profit-from-it.html.
364. See id. (pointing out that “[c]urrent Chinese laws . . . are relatively lenient towards online
plagiarism—with a maximum compensation of . . . about $76,700[] for lawsuits”—and suggesting
that “changes” to these enforcement mechanisms “may be on the horizon”).
365. See China Uses Blockchain Technology To Shore Up Copyright Protections for Digital Works,
CHINA BANKING NEWS (June 3, 2021), https://www.chinabankingnews.com/2021/06/03/china-usesblockchain-technology-to-shore-up-copyright-protections-for-digital-works/ (noting that the
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National Intellectual Property Strategy calls for the “establishment of national
standards for China’s digital copyright protection technology” and use of
“new technologies such as artificial intelligence and blockchain in the field of
radio, television[,] and network audiovisual copyright protection.”366 Experimentation with such technologies is already well underway in copyright litigation scenarios.367 A blockchain-enabled registry (not unlike the national
registry envisioned in Section IV.B above) is already accepting submissions
from authors to create tamper-proof, permanent records of their work and
ownership information.368 This enables authors to prove copyright ownership
in court—a far-too-burdensome and expensive procedural hurdle in Chinese
copyright infringement litigation that can significantly impede enforcement
efforts.369 The use of blockchain for evidentiary purposes is a meaningful improvement in civil and administrative copyright enforcement.370
However, if China aims for a truly leapfrog enforcement system, these
and related technologies have the potential for much broader application than
just evidentiary and procedural uses in litigation.371 A registration system
such as the one described in Section IV.B above could be used to identify
potential infringements across the web. One imagines that with a secure record of ownership and a work ID on record, a state-run copyright monitoring
system, akin to YouTube’s private Content ID program except web-wide on
China’s internet, could constantly scan the web for piratical instances of the
registrant’s work and notify the copyright owner through the WeChat copyright app dashboard of potential infringements.372 The copyright owner could,

“Chinese judicial system already actively makes use of blockchain solutions, with the [i]nternet courts
of Beijing, Hangzhou[,] and Guangzhou using the technology for the processing of evidence”).
366. See In-Depth Implementation Plan, supra note 208, at art. 81.
367. See China Uses Blockchain Technology To Shore Up Copyright Protections for Digital Works,
supra note 365.
368. See Miranda Wood, Chinese Court First To Use Blockchain Secured Evidence for Criminal
Conviction, LEDGER INSIGHTS (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.ledgerinsights.com/china-court-conviction-blockchain-secured-evidence/.
369. See China Uses Blockchain Technology To Shore Up Copyright Protections for Digital Works,
supra note 365 (noting how blockchain gives a path for the registration, trading, and
maintenance of online copyrights).
370. See id. (calling blockchain a “natural fit” with copyright enforcement and noting its use for
processing evidence in internet courts).
371. See id. (suggesting that blockchain technology can be used for much more than the “processing
of evidence,” such as infringement monitoring, letter delisting, and copyright mediation).
372. Leading Chinese content platforms already deploy filtering technologies to detect and root out
infringing content on their sites. And, of course, the Chinese government notoriously engages in far
more intrusive monitoring of online content for other purposes. We acknowledge the risk that free
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with a click of a button on the app, issue takedown notices to all sites identified. If such a system were combined with a notice-and-stay-down regime
akin to the framework established by Article 17 of the European Union Copyright Directive, the platforms that host the infringing content would be required to remove it and use best efforts to prevent its reappearance or face
liability.373 Because the infringement notices would be issued in conjunction
with the ownership data in the blockchain, the notice would be automatically
verified, removing the evidentiary hurdle some platforms impose on copyright
owners to delay procedures. Combined, these technologies and provisions
would enable large and independent copyright owners alike to achieve a level
of efficiency and simplicity in their enforcement efforts that would be unrivaled in the world.
As noted above, enforcement by itself is not a value add. Our dream copyright system, therefore, would not just streamline and improve enforcement;
it would provide an effortless solution to instantly convert infringement into
licensed use. The WeChat copyright app could provide the copyright owner
with the option of including with the takedown notice an offer to license her
content. With the click of a button, the site hosting the infringing content
could then disable the takedown request, continue making the content available, and begin issuing micropayments according to the terms of the offer,
which would presumably be default, industry-standard terms in most cases.
The platform would always have the option to decline the license and remove
the content. But if the platform ignores the license option and takedown request after a specified period of time, the copyright owner could launch a virtual infringement action directly through the app.374
E. Ensure a Competitive Marketplace for Distribution of Copyrighted Works
China’s recent history demonstrates why its dream copyright regime
needs to be situated in a robust competitive content distribution marketplace.375 As one of us has noted elsewhere, revenue stream diversity is critical
speech, civil liberties, and secondary innovation could be impinged through expanded use of filtering
technologies. Striking the appropriate balance requires a broader discussion beyond the present scope.
Our point here is only that such capabilities already exist and, appropriately calibrated to target unambiguous instances of infringing content, could potentially deliver substantial benefits.
373. See Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019
Relating to Copyright on the Digital Single Market, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92.
374. See Tashea, supra note 346 (discussing litigation hosted via WeChat app).
375. See Priest, Copyright Extremophiles, supra note 88, at 520, 539 (“[T]he optimal environment
for cultivating high quality creative production is one that supports a stable, economically robust
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to develop and sustain vibrant content industries in China.376 Having multiple
viable distribution channels is a key condition for copyright revenue stream
diversity. 377 In a two-sided market, in which the intermediary is both the
buyer and seller of content, market dominance is harmful not only for competitors and consumers but also for copyright owners because that intermediary becomes a monopsony (the dominant buyer) and has enormous negotiating leverage to put downward pressure on licensing fees.378 In 2011, China’s
mobile phone providers controlled the $4 billion market for ring-back tones
(that is, “hold music” a subscriber chooses for callers to listen to as they await
the subscriber’s answer).379 The mobile companies used their dominance to
keep 98% of the revenues for themselves.380
The pervasiveness of exclusive licensing described in Section IV.B has
helped drive an extreme winner-takes-all market for digital distribution services, especially in China’s music-streaming industry. 381 Starting around
2014, Tencent obtained exclusive licenses from the major international record
companies, most large regional record companies, and many independent labels.382 This made some sense at the time because the deals were lucrative
and were essentially “found money” for copyright owners in a market that had
yielded little before. Moreover, as noted above, Tencent was welcomed as a
well-funded, well-connected partner in the fight against rampant online piracy
in China.
The plan was that Tencent would act as copyright owners’ exclusive agent
in China and sublicense the rights to Tencent’s competitors. In other words,
Tencent became a de facto licensing collective with exclusive licenses for
sound recordings and underlying compositions.383 Notably, this practice is

professional creative ecosystem.”).
376. See id. at 514–20.
377. See id. at 518–20.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 501–02.
380. Id. at 540.
381. See supra Section IV.B.
382. See, e.g., Cate Cadell, China’s Tencent Seals Exclusive Music Licensing Deal with UMG,
REUTERS (May 16, 2017, 3:58 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tencent-umgidUSKCN18C16A; Sony Music Inks New Exclusive China Deal with Tencent for Digital Catalogue,
MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/sony-music-resigns-china-deal-tencent-digital-catalogue/ (noting that Tencent had signed exclusive licensing deals
with Warner, Sony, and other Western labels beginning in 2014).
383. See Priest, Meet the New Media, supra note 125, at 1086–87 (describing the exclusive copyright agent model and how this system has played out in the Chinese music industry).
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largely unique to China.384 Exclusive content licenses in developed markets
are rare, especially in the music context; nonexclusive licensing is the norm.
This explains why music-streaming services from Apple, Spotify, Amazon,
and Tidal have largely the same catalog offerings.385 Copyright owners believe that content is best monetized—and consumers best served—when a
plethora of outlets distribute the content.386 Moreover, they always worry
about conferring too much market power on one intermediary through exclusive licensing, so any exclusive licensing deals tend to be very limited in scope
and duration.387 Network effects make online intermediaries tremendously
powerful. If that power is compounded with the market power that comes
from holding a vast portfolio of long-term exclusive licenses to the most popular content, the intermediary’s dominance is all but assured.388 Predictably,
therefore, Tencent achieved a 73% market share.389 Tencent’s nearest competitor, NetEase, has just 21% of the market.390
To appreciate how dominant Tencent has been, consider that, in the United
States, performance rights societies ASCAP and BMI have been under the
aforementioned Department of Justice consent decrees for eighty years because of concerns about their market power and effects on competition.391
ASCAP and BMI are forbidden from acquiring exclusive licenses because of
384. Id. at 1083.
385. See Ty Pendlebury, Best Music Streaming Service for 2021, CNET (Oct. 19, 2021, 9:27 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/best-music-streaming-service/ (noting that most
music streaming services “offer [similar] music catalogs of over 60 million songs”). Because of differences in how music and video are consumed, exclusive licenses in the video-streaming context are
more common, even in the United States where video-streaming providers tend to use exclusive content deals—and ownership of originally produced content in vertical integration models—as ways to
establish market dominance. See Julia Alexander, NBC and CBS’s New Peacock Deal Highlights
How Complicated Keeping up with Streaming Will Become, THE VERGE (July 1, 2020, 12:14 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/1/21309854/peacock-nbc-universalviacomcbs-paramount-showtime-streaming-licensing. Hence, we see platform wars between Netflix, Disney Plus, Apple TV+,
and so on. Id.
386. See Dan Schechter, Why TV Content Owners Should Stream on Multiple Platforms, THE WRAP
(Aug. 24, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.thewrap.com/why-tv-content-owners-should-stream-multiple-platforms/.
387. See Priest, Meet the New Media, supra note 125, at 1090 (explaining that, in the United States,
exclusive content deals are “less common” and are typically only used as part of a limited, windowed
retail release strategy for a handful of blockbuster titles).
388. See id. at 1090–91.
389. See Zhanhang Ye, ByteDance Reportedly Will Roll out Domestic Music Streaming App in
2021, TECHNODE (Sept. 17, 2021), https://technode.com/2021/09/17/bytedance-to-roll-out-china-music-streaming-app-in-2021/.
390. See id.
391. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
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the formidable market power exclusive licenses confer.392 Tencent, were it
situated in the United States, would be akin to ASCAP and BMI rolled into
one entity that controls exclusive rights to most sound recordings and compositions and happens to own Spotify and Apple Music, too. Predictably, competitors in China’s streaming music space complained that Tencent abused its
market power by offering sublicenses at extortionate prices. 393 In 2020,
SAMR imposed on Tencent something like a consent decree: Tencent must
unwind its exclusive deals with record labels, and although it was allowed to
retain exclusive licenses with individual artists, it must sublicense those rights
under reasonable terms.394 The move was likely too little too late. Regulators
were aware of complaints for years, but by the time they acted, Tencent had
enjoyed ample opportunity to cement its dominance. As Variety reports,
While some commentary has pointed to the ruling as a landmark in which the SAMR is taking retrospective action
against a merger deal that cannot be undone, its impact may
in fact be smaller. One of Tencent Music’s more serious
music streaming rivals, the Alibaba-backed Xiami Music,
shuttered in February.395
In early 2022, the National Copyright Administration of China entered
the fray, promulgating a general ban on most exclusive licenses in the digital
music space.396
392. See Michael A. Einhorn, The ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees: Is Partial Withdraw Wise?,
62 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 199, 200 (2014) (pointing out that “[l]icensing under the Consent
Decree is non-exclusive”).
393. Frater, supra note 276.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Eduardo Baptista, China Bans Most Exclusive Copyright Deals for Digital Music Platforms,
REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2022), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/chinas-copyright-authority-bans-digital103557779.html. Interestingly, the 2020 Draft Copyright Law Amendments proposed language that
would prohibit copyright owners from “affect[ing the] normal communications of works by abusing
their rights when exercising their copyright.” See 中华人民共和国著作权法修正案(草案) [Draft
Amendment to the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China], art. 4 (Nat’l People’s Cong.,
June 5, 2020), https://npcobserver.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/copyright-law-draft-amendment.pdf.
There was some speculation that this language might have been intended to give the National Copyright Administration of China authority to penalize the use of copyright in ways that have anticompetitive effects. See Mark Cohen, Public Interest and Private Rights in the Copyright Law Amendments,
CHINA IPR (June 7, 2020), https://chinaipr.com/2020/06/07/public-interest-and-private-rights-in-thecopyright-law-amendments/. The draft language never made it into the 2020 Copyright Law as promulgated, but that seems not to have deterred National Copyright Administration officials from exercising antitrust regulator-like authority over competition in the digital music market.
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The regulatory action to rein in Tencent’s market power was necessary,
but it also exacerbates a problematic trend in China: approaching intellectual
property as a regulatory regime in which top-down state control over markets
for information goods displaces a decentralized market based on property
rights.397 Price controls, compulsory licenses, and other tools of market regulators designed to level the competitive playing field for licensees can result
in a host of problems that inhibit the development of the kind of vibrant cultural industry ecosystem we have argued is key to the Chinese Dream. 398
Technological and legal innovations of the kinds we have outlined herein
would allow China to leapfrog past such heavy-handed, inefficient twentiethcentury managerial models and return to market-based solutions.
Thus, in our “dream” copyright system, the state’s ideal role is supporting
and facilitating a market infrastructure with the kinds of solutions we envision
in previous Sections. Central regulation of information goods markets is unnecessary if the legal, administrative, and technological infrastructure is in
place to facilitate and encourage a well-functioning market for private licensing transactions. Technological solutions that facilitate convenient and affordable nonexclusive licensing via multiple outlets network-wide and ensure
a transparent, reliable, and efficient royalty distribution will eventually make
the exclusive licensing and maiduan practices less attractive and less necessary for Chinese copyright owners. This discussion might seem academic, at
least in the music streaming space, since Tencent’s dominance is already well
settled despite SAMR’s belated clampdown.399 However, we think these principles still have tremendous currency. First, leveling the licensing landscape
through market-oriented policies that promote nonexclusive licensing to diverse outlets can stimulate the development of more outlets and promote competition in the streaming space.400 Second, as Elton John once sang, “sooner

397. See, e.g., Mark Cohen, Reviewing Recent Literature on the WTO and Antitrust in IP, CHINA
IPR (Aug. 9, 2021), https://chinaipr.com/2021/08/09/reviewing-recent-literature-on-the-wto-and-antitrust-in-ip/. China is not alone in the creep toward regulatory IP regimes; the trend is well-recognized
by U.S. legal scholars. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 88 (2004);
Mark A. Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109 (2013); ROBERT P.
MERGES, CATO INSTITUTE, COMPULSORY LICENSING VS. THE THREE “GOLDEN OLDIES”: PROPERTY
RIGHTS, CONTRACTS, AND MARKETS, POLICY ANALYSIS (2004).
398. See e.g., MERGES, supra note 397, at 6–7.
399. See Frater, supra note 276 (speculating that SAMR’s clampdown on Tencent might be too late
to meaningfully alter the competitive landscape in China’s music streaming market).
400. See Ye, supra note 389 (reporting that, as a result of SAMR’s market intervention and invalidation of Tencent’s exclusive licenses, another major Chinese internet player, Bytedance, sees an
opening to launch a streaming music service that competes directly with Tencent).
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or later everybody’s kingdom must end.”401 Tencent’s dominance will not last
forever. New apps, and indeed new methods of delivering music via shortform video or models yet to be conceived, emerge daily to ultimately upend
today’s incumbents.402 A new Chinese internet giant, Bytedance, has already
emerged in recent years to challenge Tencent’s dominance in China’s online
media and social networking sphere. Currently, Bytedance’s Douyin app,
which is the China-focused version of Bytedance’s globally successful TikTok short-form video app, boasts 443 million Chinese users—more than half
of China’s enormous population of mobile internet users.403 Like Tik-Tok,
Douyin has become a major destination for users to stream music and discover
new artists and content, cutting into Tencent’s music market.404 Now that
Tencent no longer has exclusive rights to major content, Bytedance is planning to leverage its success in the short-form video market to launch a dedicated music-streaming platform in China to directly compete with Tencent’s
music services.405 At the same time, new rivals are already chipping away at
Douyin’s dominance in the socially networked video space with their own
signature features that distinguish them from Douyin and other rivals.406 As
new competitors and new paradigms ascend, they should arise into a licensing
environment optimized to promote competition through market forces and
nonexclusive licensing practices, lessening the need for top-down market controls.
VI. THE CHINESE COPYRIGHT DREAM REQUIRES EMBRACING BOTTOM-UP
CREATIVITY
A last—and perhaps most important—component of the Chinese copyright dream is a commitment to embracing bottom-up creativity. We have
argued—as have Chinese copyright officials—that copyright is a pillar of the

401. ELTON JOHN, The King Must Die, on ELTON JOHN (DJM Records 1969).
402. Cf. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 84 (Routledge 2003)
(1943) (describing the cyclical economic process of “creative destruction” by which entrepreneurial
startup firms undermine and ultimately replace successful incumbent firms).
403. Shawn Lim, Can Douyin’s Regional Rivals Challenge It for Top Dog in China’s Short-Form
Video Market?, THE DRUM (June 22, 2021), https://www.thedrum.com/news/2021/06/22/can-douyins-regional-rivals-challenge-it-top-dog-china-s-short-form-video-market.
404. See Saheli Roy Choudhury, The Chinese Version of TikTok Now Has 600 Million Daily Active
Users, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/15/bytedance-douyin-has-600-million-daily-activeusers.html (Sept. 16, 2020, 4:33 AM).
405. See Ye, supra note 389.
406. See Lim, supra note 403.
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Chinese Dream and, thus, a pillar of China’s economic and social development in the twenty-first century.407 But developing a copyright system that
fulfills this promise will require a marked deviation from China’s standard
technocratic development playbook. The kind of creative “masterpieces” that
Chinese officials recognize are necessary to undergird a world-class creative
economy cannot be engineered top-down like poured concrete for a freeway.
Modern propaganda works that reflect what central authorities want consumers to see, not what creatives conjure or the market demands, are bound to fall
flat.408 And while today’s savvily produced patriotic films featuring high production values and dazzling A-list stars look the part superficially, their novelty appeal will wane without a fresh infusion of new ideas. In the long run,
compelling art and culture that connects deeply with audiences, has lasting
value and global appeal, and indeed, inspires dreams, is most likely to arise
from autonomous, decentralized processes.
Of course, even in a “dream” copyright ecosystem the state plays a critical
role. That role, however, is ideally limited to developing and implementing
the technical and legal infrastructure to support a world-leading ecosystem for
the production and commercialization of cultural goods and then largely stepping back to allow cultural production to bubble up organically into a wellfunctioning free market. In China, of course, it is not just a dream but a pipe
dream to imagine that in the foreseeable future the state would take a fundamentally hands-off approach to cultural production. This fact need not be fatal
to China’s copyright aspirations, however. While centralized control and decentralized production may seem contradictory, they are not zero-sum but rather coexist on a sliding scale.409 The state can provide infrastructure to support decentralized cultural production and still practice censorship and some
measure of central control. 410 The key issue is the degree of control: the more
407. See Zhang Jianchun, Comprehensively Strengthen Copyright Protection and Promote the Construction of a New Development Pattern, NAT’L COPYRIGHT ADMINISTRATION (June 3, 2021),
https://www-ncac-gov-cn.translate.goog/chinacopyright/contents/12227/354439.shtml?_x_tr_sl=zhCN&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=ajax,elem&_x_tr_sch=http (discussing and analyzing
the keynote speech of the Vice Minister of China’s Central Propaganda Department at the 2021 China
Internet Copyright Protection and Development Conference). “It can be said that copyright has become the most important basic resource for the development of cultural industries, and the copyright
industry has become an important pillar of my country’s national economy.” Id.
408. See, e.g., Priest, Copyright Extremophiles, supra note 88, at 491 n.133 (recounting the story of
the high-profile 2013 propaganda film Young Lei Feng that closed on opening day, despite bullish
expectations, after reportedly failing to sell “a single ticket” in several major cities).
409. See generally Priest, Copyright and Free Expression, supra note 33.
410. See e.g., Hongsong Song, The Development of Copyright Law and the Transition of Press
Control in China, OR. REV. INT’L L. 249, 304 (2014) (“The evolution of copyright law in China reveals
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top-down control the Party exercises over cultural production, the more fettered China’s copyright dream and, consequently, we argue, the more fettered
the Chinese Dream.411
Thus, reaching the heights we have imagined in this Article will require
understanding of the value of strong cultural industries as being more than
propaganda vessels. It will require acceptance that bottom-up processes, not
central engineering, are the best way to get there. And it will require a deeper
commitment within China’s leadership to copyright law.
Copyright has long been half-heartedly embraced by Chinese officials.412
While understood as a necessary evil, the party has an internally contradictory
disposition toward it.413 On the one hand, copyright is necessary to comply
with international commitments, and there is growing recognition of its importance to sustain cultural industries, whose growth is valued for many of the
reasons we have highlighted above. On the other hand, because copyright
transfers some measure of control over expressive communication—the medium of ideology—to private parties, it is viewed with suspicion.414 Such internal ambivalence means that copyright is promoted while simultaneously
restrained or even hamstrung by official recalcitrance.415
Accordingly, a threshold requirement of any Chinese copyright dream arguably must be to overcome such ambivalence. Otherwise, official obstruction could render other reforms nugatory. What is needed is an unambiguous,
full-throated endorsement from the top levels of government and assignment
of concomitant priority to the copyright mission. To dream boldly, you have
to commit. After all, you cannot dream with one eye open.
Thinking globally, China’s aspirations of restoring itself to global cultural
power status, with the coveted attendant soft-power benefits, will always remain unfulfilled so long as China’s creators are shackled by censors. Authenticity is vitally important to media and art. If global audiences believe the
speaker lacks the freedom to express herself, the speaker’s ability to connect

that the reemergence, development, and improvement of China’s copyright law positively correlates
with the degree of relaxation of press control in these sectors. Without the various reforms and open
door policies and the subsequent media commercialization, the reintroduction of copyright into China
would have been impossible.”).
411. See, e.g., id. at 295.
412. See id. at 270 (noting that since its inception in the PRC, copyright law has been dogged by
official concerns about putting information production and ownership in private hands).
413. See id.
414. See id.
415. See id. at 305.
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with the audience is lost. 416 This dynamic has long undermined China’s efforts to accumulate soft power. As Joseph Nye observes, governments cannot
engineer soft power the way they engineer military or economic power because soft power emanates from culture and values, which are in the sphere
of civil society rather than government.417 Indeed, if audiences suspect the
government’s fingerprint is on the cultural production, its soft power potential
is usually decimated.418 “Soft power depends on credibility, and when governments are perceived as manipulative and information is seen as propaganda, credibility is destroyed.”419 Because of China’s pervasive censorship,
works that derive from the Mainland are believed to have been approved by
censors and lack authenticity in the minds of audiences.420 Works produced
outside the censorship apparatus are more likely to be viewed as authentic,
especially if they are subversive.421 But subversive works tend to have a tarnishing rather than burnishing effect on China’s global image.
Today, it is hard to imagine a future when all artists in China enjoy unfettered creative freedom and China experiences a new golden age of cultural
diversity and innovation. After all, nearly a decade after Xi heralded the Chinese Dream, his own dream for China’s cultural industries appears to involve
ever-tighter content controls, primacy placed on propaganda productions, and
a backward-looking fixation on Mao-era revolutionary productions.422
Some speculate that Xi’s regime has cast aside its aspirations to global
soft power—that Xi’s purpose for creating strong cultural industries is not to
cultivate dreams or influence global views of China but rather to create a
louder, more effective megaphone for Party messaging.423
Such claims seem overstated. China’s historical legacy of cultural
416. See Robert Daly, A Rise Without Shine: The Global Weakness of Chinese Culture, WILSON
CTR. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/rise-without-shine-the-global-weaknesschinese-culture-qu-cheng-shui-bu-dao (arguing that Chinese popular culture lacks global appeal because of a lack of artistic credibility resulting from pervasive censorship).
417. See Nye, Jr., China’s Soft Power Deficit, supra note 140.
418. See id.; Daly, supra note 416.
419. NYE, JR., THE FUTURE OF POWER, supra note 138, at 83.
420. See Freymann, supra note 39 (“Part of the lack of appeal [of Chinese-produced media designed
for foreign audiences] is that foreign viewers know it’s produced by the CCP. There’s a legitimacy
factor: if the audience outside China doesn’t think Chinese state media is fair or objective or independent, their first instinct is to disbelieve whatever they’re shown.”) (quoting Maria Repnikova).
421. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
422. See Rebecca Davis, China’s Film Authority Orders All Cinemas To Screen Propaganda Films
at Least Twice a Week, VARIETY (Apr. 2, 2021), https://variety.com/2021/film/news/china-communist-party-100th-anniversary-propaganda-1234943360/.
423. See, e.g., Fischer & Allen-Ebrahimian, supra note 82.
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hegemony is deeply ingrained in its self-image: China’s own name for itself—
Zhongguo, or “Middle Kingdom”—underscores its aspirations to play a central role in all things, culture included. Therefore, any move away from
China’s soft power goals would seem at best a tactical retreat. It is also possible that Xi’s global soft power aims remain intact, and that a simultaneous
inward-focused emphasis on command-and-control culture reflects cognitive
dissonance and contradictory impulses in Chinese cultural policy.
Even if we assume, however, that China has turned entirely inward and
embraced a Dream of centralized control, it still does not follow that the current top-down approach to cultural production will achieve its intended result.
Although China may enjoy temporary success pursuing such a heavy-handed,
dirigiste approach, in the long run this path is a recipe for stagnation, apathy,
and failure. Jingoistic nationalist culture will eventually grow stale, and the
infusion of fresh talent and ideas needed to foment creativity will falter in a
top-down, state-dominated cultural industry. Moreover, by shutting down a
vital source of bottom-up expression, China’s rulers will stifle the popular
discourse that is essential to maintaining the Party’s continued legitimacy.
In short: a strong culture is essential to realizing the Chinese dream. Topdown culture loses to bottom-up, just as command and control loses to free
markets. China’s people and its rulers will be the poorer for it.
In any case, while the present course may be toward more aggressive topdown control, no trend lasts forever, and the pendulum invariably swings the
other way. Our argument for a Chinese Copyright Dream looks beyond the
current political moment. Perhaps one day China’s leadership will have the
confidence to let China’s artists speak unfettered. As one commentator observed: “The Chinese state today is robust, yet the country’s leaders won’t let
fears of its being precariously weak die a natural death. If only they would.
Then there would be space not just for their dreams but the often different
ones of many individual Chinese.”424 Until Chinese leadership has the confidence to loosen its grip on cultural production and let Chinese artists communicate their dreams organically and authentically, China will remain frustrated, both in its unending quest to become a global cultural power and to
realize the Chinese Dream at home.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation has many facets: prosperity,
424. Wasserstrom, supra note 18.
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happiness, military strength, environmental sustainability, rule of law, and
soft power all form plausible components. Determining appropriate policies
to pursue them and assessing priorities, however, remains a challenging work
in progress. We have argued that a modernized Chinese copyright law could
play a key role in this process. A more effective copyright system would bolster China’s creative industries, generating a diverse supply of high-quality
expressive works, whose realization accords with many of these goals. More
importantly, harnessing the collective imagination of China’s authors and artists would, in turn, stimulate the robust democratic discourse that China needs
to articulate and actualize its Dream.
Accordingly, we have argued that copyright law deserves a central place
in the Chinese Dream. While the parameters of the Chinese copyright dream
are something that China must determine for itself, we have offered some tentative suggestions as to the direction such reforms could take. In particular,
we have stressed the opportunity for China to leapfrog existing global copyright regimes by harnessing its technological prowess to reimagine copyright
in a more efficient, streamlined form. Candidates for such streamlining include simplified substantive rights, an automated, online registration and licensing platform, enhanced accessibility measures for small creators, lowcost enforcement mechanisms, and targeted use of competition law. Ultimately, China must devise its own copyright system that reflects its needs and
priorities. Our main message, however, is to dream boldly. A state-of-the-art
Chinese copyright system reflecting suitably ambitious reforms will pay lasting dividends, not only for China’s creators and content industries, but ultimately for all of China.
The approach we advocate is admittedly not without risks. To succeed,
China will have to adjust its current top-down approach to cultural policy and
allow greater room for decentralized processes and experimentation. Unlike
freeways and railroads, culture cannot be engineered. Creative inspiration—
like dreams—emerges through mysterious processes. China should muster
the confidence to dream boldly in copyright policy and reap the rewards in
cultural vitality. Doing so will bring it closer to realizing the broader Chinese
Dream.
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